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Abstract
This paper examines the determinants and consequences of investor activism in ven-
ture capital. Using a hand-collected sample of European venture capital deals, it shows
the importance of human capital. Venture capital ﬁr m sw i t hp a r t n e r st h a th a v ep r i o r
business experience are more active recruiting managers and directors, helping with
fundraising, and interacting more frequently with their portfolio companies. Inde-
pendent venture capital ﬁrms are also more active than ’captive’ (bank-, corporate-,
or government-owned) ﬁrms. After controlling for endogeneity, investor activism is
shown to be positively related to the success of portfolio companies.
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own.1I n t r o d u c t i o n
It is widely believed that venture capital plays an important role for innovation and eco-
nomic growth. In the US, venture capital ﬁrms are typically organized as independent
private partnerships, run by a relatively small number of general partners. While some
of these partners previously worked in ﬁnancial institutions, many have prior business
experience. Take the example of Eugene Kleiner. Prior to founding the well-know Silicon
Valley venture capital ﬁrm Kleiner Perkins, he had been an engineer and entrepreneur. In
fact, he was one of the famous “traitorous eight” that left Shockley to start Fairchild Semi-
conductors. This brings up the question of what features make venture capital ﬁrms most
eﬀective. Is the human capital of venture partners important? And does the organizational
structure of the venture capital ﬁrm matter?
The venture capital literature identiﬁes a broad role for the investor, which goes beyond
the simple provision of ﬁnance. Venture capitalists may engage in a number of value-adding
activities, including monitoring, support and control. Those activities are largely non-
contractible, yet may have real consequences.1 Industry insiders frequently distinguish
between “hands-on” versus “hands-oﬀ” investment styles, and stress the importance of
investor activism. A recent report by the European Venture Capital Association (EVCA
(2005)), for example, notes:
The degree of activism of private equity and venture capitalists investors will
vary according to the nature and structure of investments made and the investor
should therefore ensure adequate involvement relative to the circumstances of
a particular investment.
Two open questions in the literature are (i) what investor characteristics may lead
to more investor activism, and (ii) whether an active investment style matters for the
success of portfolio companies. This paper examines how human capital and organizational
characteristics aﬀect the activity level of venture capital ﬁrms. It also considers how these
activities in turn aﬀect the likelihood of investment success.
The analysis is based on a hand-collected dataset of European venture capital invest-
ments. The data covers the period 1998-2001, and consists of a sample of venture capital
deals in 17 European countries. Our primary data source is a survey of venture capital
ﬁrms, which we augmented with numerous secondary sources. Our dataset consists of
information on 119 venture capital ﬁrms, 503 partners, and 1,652 portfolio companies.
The data collection required considerable time and eﬀort, but resulted in a dataset that is
signiﬁcantly larger than other hand-collected datasets on venture capital, and much richer
than commercially available datasets.
The measurement of investor activism represents an empirical challenge. Investors’
activities are largely non-contractible, and therefore are not speciﬁed in contracts, nor are
they recorded in standard sources of venture capital data. As a consequence, surveys are
an appropriate way of collecting direct evidence on the activities of investors. We obtain
four measures of activism: whether a venture capital ﬁrm is involved with recruiting the
1See Gompers (1995), Gorman and Sahlman (1989), Hellmann and Puri (2000, 2002), Hochberg (2004),
Hsu (2006), Kaplan and Strömberg (2004), Lerner (1994).
1management team, whether it helps assembling the company’s board of directors, whether
it provides any assistance with obtaining additional ﬁnancing, and how often it interacts
with a portfolio company. Our survey allows us to observe these activities separately for
each company that a venture capitalist invests in.
Another advantage of our data approach is that we are able to construct several mea-
sures of human capital. From our survey, we obtain data on individual partners’ back-
ground. We distinguish between three types of human capital eﬀects. First, there may
be some accumulation of job-speciﬁc knowledge, where venture capitalists become better
over time at providing services. We measure this with a partner’s years of experience as
a venture capitalist. Second, there is a partner’s knowledge of what it takes to create and
run a company. We measure this with a partner’s prior business experience. Third, there
is a partner’s formal knowledge. We measure this with a partner’s scientiﬁc education.
For each of these measures, we construct the average human capital proﬁle of the venture
ﬁrm. This allows us to examine what kind of human capital is conducive to an active in-
vestment style. In terms of organizational structure, we emphasize the distinction between
private independent venture capital ﬁrms and so-called captive ﬁrms, who are aﬃliated
with corporations, banks or government.
Our ﬁrst central ﬁnding is that human capital and organizational structure are sig-
niﬁcantly related to investor activism. Venture ﬁrms whose partners have prior business
experience are signiﬁcantly more active in the companies they ﬁnance. Interestingly, the
venture experience of the ﬁrm’s partners does not have a signiﬁcant eﬀect on this, and
science education has little eﬀect. In terms of organizational structure, we ﬁnd that pri-
vate independent venture capital ﬁrms are signiﬁcantly more involved with their portfolio
companies than captive ones. To examine whether these empirical relationships are not
merely driven by selection eﬀects we consider three alternative econometric approaches.
Intuitively, these methods exploit the fact that companies in diﬀerent countries face a dif-
ferent set of potential investors. A common thread across the three alternative approaches
is to identify selection eﬀects by exploiting exogenous markets characteristics that aﬀect
the likelihood that speciﬁc investors are matched to speciﬁc companies. Our econometric
analysis then suggests that selection eﬀects do not explain away the eﬀect of human cap-
ital and organizational structure on investor activism. We subject these results to several
robustness checks and consistently ﬁnd that they continue to hold.
Another unique feature of our data is that we have information about diﬀerent partner
roles inside venture capital ﬁrms. This allows us to examine the issue of task-allocation
within venture ﬁrms. We ﬁnd that having more venture experience or business experience
increases the likelihood that a partner is put in charge of supervising portfolio companies.
Moreover, in a ﬁxed eﬀects (conditional logit) model, we ﬁnd that within venture capi-
tal ﬁrms, greater venture experience has a positive and signiﬁcant eﬀect on the level of
activism.
The next important step is to examine whether these activities aﬀect performance.
We are faced with two main challenges: measurement and identiﬁcation. Concerning the
ﬁrst, ideally one would like to measure investor returns, but it is well known that venture
capital returns are not publicly available. We therefore follow the extant literature and
adopt an approach similar to Gompers et al. (2005) and Sørensen (2007) of measuring
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as an IPO or an acquisition. The second challenge is identiﬁcation. Simply regressing
exits on investor activism yields mostly insigniﬁcant results. Yet, this regression may
be aﬀected by endogeneity, since investors might be more active with companies that
are facing performance challenges. We therefore use an instrumental variable framework.
The key identifying assumption is that the characteristics of venture capital ﬁrms do not
aﬀect the companies’ outcomes directly, but aﬀect them indirectly through their actions,
i.e., their level of activism. We employ the human capital and organizational structure
variables as instruments for investor activism. Our second central ﬁnding is then that
a positive relationship exists between investor activism and exit performance, and that
this relationship is both statistically and economically signiﬁcant. In other words, our
instruments deal with the reverse causality problem where ﬁrms that develop performance
problems require more active involvement. We also verify that our performance results
are not driven by selection eﬀects related to the matching process between investors and
companies.
These results provide some important answers to the question about what makes ven-
ture capital ﬁrms eﬀective investors. The strongest predictor of whether a venture capital
ﬁrm adopts an active investment style is whether the partners have prior industry expe-
rience. Moreover, activism seems to improve performance. These ﬁndings are interesting
since in many countries venture capitalists have more ﬁnancial than industry backgrounds.
However, one should not simply conclude that hiring partners with prior industry experi-
ence will always increase activism and improve performance. Rather, our results can be
interpreted as an economic equilibrium outcome, where talented venture capitalists with
prior business experience are a scarce but valuable resource.
In a concurrent research project, Gompers et. al. (2005) examine the role of experience
on the investment behavior of venture capital ﬁrms. They provide evidence that prior
deal ﬂow experience helps venture capital ﬁrms to take advantage of deal opportunities
by ramping-up investments when opportunities improve, and that ramp-up often leads to
better exit performance. They use US data from Thompson VentureXpert. This has the
advantage of providing a long history of venture capital deals, but also the disadvantage
of containing little deal-speciﬁc information. Our hand-collected data captures a shorter
period of European venture capital deals with rich deal-speciﬁc information. Our data also
allows us to build direct measures of the human capital of individual venture capitalists,
while Gompers et. al. (2005) infer a venture ﬁrm’s experience from the intensity of its prior
deal ﬂow. Moreover, they do not examine investor activism, but focus only on the rela-
tionship between experience and performance. Dimov and Shepherd (2005) and Zarutskie
(2007) also report results about venture capitalists’ human capital and investment perfor-
mance, although neither explicitly consider causal mechanisms such as investor activism.
Despite these diﬀerences - including the fact the above papers use US data whereas we
use European data - a common ﬁnding is that human capital specialization matters for
investment performance.
Our emphasis on human capital is novel in the literature on ﬁnancial intermediation.
Financial intermediation requires substantial processing “soft information” (Stein (2002),
Berger, et. al. (2005)), which may naturally generate diﬀerences in the levels of investor
3activism. In a related vein, the growing literature on the mutual fund industry examines
the importance of individual fund managers (Chevalier and Ellison (1999), Berk and Green
(2004)). In a broader context, Bertrand and Schoar (2003) and Malmendier and Tate
(2005) also ﬁnd that individual managerial characteristics are a key determinant of ﬁrms’
decision making. The recent work by Puri and Robinson (2007) complements our approach
by examining human capital aspects of entrepreneurs.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses our data
sources. Section 3 motivates our choice of dependent and explanatory variables, and
provides their deﬁnition. Section 4 examines across-ﬁrms evidence on the role of human
capital. Section 5 discusses selection issues. Section 6 discusses the relationship between
investor activities and performance. Section 7 examines the role of human capital within
venture capital ﬁrms. Section 8 considers several extensions and discusses additional
robustness checks. It is followed by a brief conclusion.
2 Sources of Data
We build this paper on data which come from a variety of sources. Our primary source is a
survey that we sent to 750 venture capital ﬁrms in the following seventeen countries: Aus-
tria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg,
the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the UK. This set of
countries includes all the members of the European Union in the period under study, plus
Norway and Switzerland.
Venture ﬁrms were included in our sample if they satisﬁed three conditions: (i) they
were full members of the European Venture Capital Association (EVCA) or of a national
venture capital organization in 2001, (ii) they were actively engaged in venture capital and
(iii) they were still in operations in 2002.2
We collected our survey data between February 2002 and November 2003. We asked
venture capital ﬁrms about the investments they made between January 1998 and Decem-
ber 2001. The questions centered on key characteristics of the venture ﬁrm and, on the
involvement with portfolio companies, on some characteristics of these companies, and on
the educational background and work experience of each venture partner.3
We received 124 responses with various degrees of completeness. We excluded venture
ﬁrms that had not yet made any investments. We contacted all the venture ﬁrms that had
sent us incomplete answers and retrieved the missing information whenever possible. We
then augmented the survey data with information from the websites of the respondents and
their portfolio companies. We also turned to commercially available databases: Amadeus,
Worldscope, and VenturExpert, as well as trade publications like the directories of national
2While we excluded private equity ﬁrms that only engage in non-venture private equity deals such
as mezzanine ﬁnance, management buy-outs (MBOs) or leveraged buy-outs (LBOs), we included private
equity ﬁr m st h a ti n v e s ti nboth venture capital and non-venture private equity deals. For these, we
considered only their venture capital investments. See Fenn, Liang and Prowse (2003) for a discussion of
how the venture capital market is structured in two diﬀerent segments, ’venture capital’ and ’non-venture
private equity.’
3Throughout the paper we reserve the term ’ﬁrm’ for the investor (i.e., the venture capital ﬁrm) and
the term ’company’ to the company that receives the venture capital ﬁnancing.
4venture capital associations. We use information from these sources to obtain missing
information, such as the dates, stages, and amounts of venture deals, and we also use it
to cross-check the information obtained from respondents. Such cross-validation further
enhances the reliability of our data. The resulting dataset consists of data on 119 venture
ﬁrms, 503 venture partners and 1,652 portfolio companies. Notice also that we only use
data on a venture ﬁrm’s ﬁrst ﬁnancing in the portfolio company, i.e., we do not count a
follow-up investment as a separate deal.
We also collect some data on subsequent outcomes to companies, i.e., what is commonly
called the “exit events.” For each company we determine whether it has been listed on
the stock market through an IPO or whether it has been acquired by another company.
We performed this data collection in early 2006, so that we are able to assess exits up
to the end of 2005. This gives us a considerable time lag between the initial investment,
which makes us conﬁdent that we are able to capture a substantial fraction of successful
investments. As data sources we use three commercial databases by Thomson Financial,
namely VentureXpert, SDC’s M&A database, and SDC’s Global New Issues database.
We then check the website of all European and North American stock exchanges for
listed companies. Moreover, we check the websites of each company and venture capital
ﬁrm. We use the data from the websites to augment and cross-check the data from the
commercial databases. Finally, for data still missing, we contacted companies and venture
ﬁrms directly.
Because of the survey nature of our data, we perform a variety of checks to assess
how well the sample represents the population of European venture capital ﬁrms. Other
papers in the literature avoid this type of question, because it is extremely diﬃcult to
gather information on the population. We use information from the main commercial
database, VenturExpert, and from the European Venture Capital Association. We also
gathered additional data by contacting all ﬁrms in the population through phone calls
and through their websites. This required considerable eﬀort but allowed us to collect
information on more than two thirds of the population. We use this information in Table
1, which compares the sample with the population it is drawn from. Panel A looks at
the country composition. While there is some variation in response rates across countries,
our data represent a comprehensive cross-section which provides a good coverage of all
countries, with an overall response rate of nearly 16%. This response rate is larger than the
typical response rate for comparable surveys of industrial ﬁrms, which is around 9% (see
the discussion by Graham and Harvey (2001)). No single country dominates the sample,
and no country is left out. Remarkably, even the larger venture capital markets are well
represented: France, Germany, and the UK all have response rates above 13%. Another
strength of our data is that it is not dominated by a few large respondents: the largest
venture capital ﬁrm accounts for only 5% of the observations, and the largest 5 venture
capital ﬁrms for only 16% of the observations.
Panel B looks at the structure of both sample and population in terms of venture
ﬁrm type. We partition the sample into independent, bank, corporate, and public ven-
ture capital ﬁrms. Clearly, our sample closely reﬂects the distribution of types in the
population.
Panel C compares the size distribution of our respondents with that of the population.
5We consider two size measures: the number of partners, and the amount of funds under
management, both measured at the end of 2001. The number of partners is a simple
size measure for this form of ﬁnancial intermediation, which crucially depends on a few
high-quality professionals. For the sample and the population both the mean and median
values of partners virtually coincide. The amount under management includes all funds
managed by a venture capital ﬁrm, including those invested in non-venture private equity.
The average ﬁrms size is larger for the population, due to the presence of some very large
private equity ﬁrms that invest mainly in non-venture private equity that chose not to
respond to our survey. Consistent with this, the median ﬁrm size is very similar for the
sample and the population.
A common criticism of sample-based data is that respondents report may be biased,
especially towards more successful deals. We deal with this concern in several ways. First,
in late 2003 we checked the websites of all respondents. We ﬁnd that venture ﬁrms reported
to us over 90% of the portfolio companies listed on their websites (we exclude 15 venture
ﬁrms whose website did not list portfolio companies). Since two years had elapsed from
the closing of our sample, and new investments had naturally been made, we conclude
that it is unlikely that our sample suﬀers from systematic under-reporting. Second, we
compare the exit rates for our sample with the oﬃcial statistics of the European Venture
Capital Association (EVCA), which classiﬁes as exits IPOs, mergers and acquisitions.
The EVCA is the most authoritative source of aggregate venture capital data for Europe,
and collects these data with a systematic and consistent methodology across countries.
We ﬁnd that 23.6% of the companies in our sample had a successful exit rate over the
period 1998-2005. This compares with an exit rate of 25.6% for the EVCA data, when we
count investments and exits over the same period. It therefore appears that our sample
is not biased towards more successful companies. Third, we also examine the possibility
that our respondents might choose not to answer all of our questions about activism
when their companies are not performing well. To see whether our data present any
such bias, we performed some additional tests. For all of our dependent variables we
correlate the exit rate with the response rate. We ﬁnd that the correlation coeﬃcients
are all below 6%. In unreported regressions, we also estimated Probit models for the
response rate of all of our dependent variables, to see whether the exit rate might explain
them, after controlling for other observable characteristics. Naturally, we can only control
for those characteristics for which we have complete or near-complete reporting, namely
investor characteristics and company sectors (see Section 3). We ﬁnd that the exit rate is
statistically insigniﬁcant in terms of explaining response rates. All this suggests that there
is no systematic reporting bias towards more successful companies. Finally, one might also
be worried about recollection biases, where respondents might have diﬀerent answers for
more versus less recent transactions. Our analysis controls for this through the use of deal
year controls.
3D a t a v a r i a b l e s
In this Section we provide an economic motivation for our choice of variables. Table 2
summarizes the deﬁnitions of our variables, and how they have been constructed. Table 3
6contains descriptive statistics for allt h ev a r i a b l e su s e di nt h ea n a l y s i s .
Our dependent variables concern actions that venture capitalists can perform for their
companies. The main independent variables concern the human capital and the organi-
zational structure of the venture capital ﬁrms. Our analysis also controls for the types of
contracts used in the transaction, and for the characteristics of the recipient companies.
3.1 Motivating the dependent variables
Our dependent variables aim to capture venture capital ﬁrms’ involvement with their
companies. The strength of using hand-collected survey data is that it provides us with a
variety of activism measures that are otherwise not available. Table 2(a) provides formal
deﬁnitions of these variables.
The theoretical work of Casamatta (2003), Cestone (2004), Hellmann (2006), Inderst
and Müller (2004), Repullo and Suarez (2004), and Schmidt (2003) shows how in a double
moral hazard setting, eﬀort levels of venture capitalist inﬂuence outcomes. This eﬀort can
be interpreted as a variety of activities that venture capitalists undertake.
One of the areas where eﬀort might matter concerns the role that investors play in
structuring the management team. Hellmann and Puri (2002) show that venture cap-
italists play a substantial role in the professionalization of management teams (see also
Sahlman (1990)). Our ﬁrst dependent variable (RECRUITING) therefore reports whether
an investor gets involved in recruiting management teams.
The importance of active governance in venture capital is explained by Dessein (2005),
Hellmann (1998). Gompers (1995), Gompers and Lerner (1996), Hochberg (2004), Kaplan
and Strömberg (2003, 2004), and Lerner (1995) provide supporting empirical evidence.
Our second dependent variable (DIRECTORS) is a measure of how much the venture
capital ﬁrm plays an active role in building a board of directors.
Fundraising is a vital process for entrepreneurial companies. While their own funding
capabilities may be more limited, venture capital ﬁrms can play a key role in the process
of obtaining additional ﬁnancing from other ﬁnanciers. Our third dependent variable
(FUNDRAISING) examines whether an investor helped the company with raising funds
from other sources.
The concept of monitoring pervades not only the venture capital literature, but the
literature on ﬁnancial intermediation more broadly (Petersen and Rajan (1994, 1995),
Hoshi, Kashyap and Scharfstein (1991)). Venture capitalists also monitor their companies’
progress, although they may diﬀer in their monitoring intensities (Gompers (1995)). Note
that monitoring need not be a value-adding activity per se, since it concerns mainly the
amount of communication between the investor and the company. Our fourth dependent
variable (INTERACTION) concerns the intensity of investor-company communication,
measuring the reported frequency with which an investor communicates with the company.
In Sections 6, 7 and 8 we introduce and motivate some additional dependent variables.
73.2 Motivating the independent variables
3.2.1 Motivating the human capital variables
Ultimately, ﬁnancial intermediation is performed by people, suggesting that human capi-
tal is likely to matter.4 We consider two possible reasons why human capital may aﬀect
investor activities. First, there may be some job-speciﬁc learning, where venture part-
ners learn on the job how to become active investors. For this, we look at a partner’s
experience in venture capital, as measured by the number of years that s/he has worked
in the venture capital industry. The natural conjecture is that having more experience
improves a partner’s ability to perform his/her tasks. Second, a partner’s knowledge base
may inﬂuence his/her investment activities. By knowledge base we mean the experience
that the partner brings to the job from prior activities. We focus on two distinct source
of knowledge base: prior work experience and education. For work experience, we look at
whether the individual partner had some business experience before becoming a venture
capitalist, be it by working in industry (including being an entrepreneur) or consulting.
Prior business experience might help a partner to better understand the challenges of
portfolio companies, providing a measure of the partner’s experience in handling busi-
ness problems. To construct the business experience variable, we focus on industry and
consulting experiences, where people are typically exposed to a broad set of managerial
challenges, and distinguish this from more functionally specialized work experiences, such
as accounting, ﬁnance, or law. In the press, this is often referred to as the diﬀerence
between ’Main street’ versus ’Wall street’ types. For education, we speciﬁc a l l yl o o ka t
whether a partner has an education in science or technology. Formal education in science
may give a partner a better and deeper knowledge, that can facilitate the appreciation of
the technological and operational challenges of the companies s/he is in charge of. Table
2(b) provides formal deﬁnitions of these variables.
For most of the analysis we measure human capital proﬁles at the level of the venture
ﬁrm. For this we measure the human capital of each partner, and then take the average
across all partners within the ﬁrm.5 In Section 7 we also introduce alternative ways of
measuring human capital.
3.2.2 Motivating the organizational variables
The organizational structure of a venture capital ﬁrm can inﬂuence its strategic objectives,
and with it, its level of activism. The most important organizational dimension is whether
a venture capital ﬁrm is independent or not. Independent ﬁrms are proﬁtd r i v e na n d
can deﬁne their own investment styles. By contrast, the behavior of ’captive’ venture
capital ﬁrms–those owned by a bank, a corporation, or the government–can be strongly
aﬀected by the strategic goals of their parent organization. The work of Gompers and
4The seminal work of Hayek (1945) and Becker (1964) emphasizes the importance of individuals’ hu-
man capital, in terms of acquiring speciﬁc knowledge about a narrow range of problems, and acquiring
competencies valuable for decision making and value creation.
5In our survey we asked: Identify anonymously all partners/senior managers active as of December
2001;w es p e c i ﬁed that: a partner or senior manager is a person with investment decision power within
your ﬁrm, i.e. somebody who can decide whether to fund or not a company.
8Lerner (2000), Hellmann (2002), and Hellmann, Lindsey and Puri (2007)) shows that
captive venture capital ﬁrms behave diﬀerently than their independent counterparts.
Our analysis also controls for the age and size of venture capital ﬁrms. Looking at US
data, Gompers (1996) and Gompers and Lerner (1999) suggest that the size and age of a
venture capital ﬁrm may be a proxy for its quality and reputation. Fulghieri and Sevilir
(2004) theorize about complementarities between eﬀort and the size of a venture capital
portfolio. In the European context, the age of a venture capital ﬁrm also signals its vintage:
older ﬁrms were founded at a time when the European venture capital industry was still in
its infant stages (Bottazzi and Da Rin (2004), Da Rin, Nicodano, and Sembenelli (2006)),
so that the relationship between age and quality need not be as strong. Table 2(c) provides
formal deﬁnitions of all the organizational variables.
3.2.3 Motivating the contractual variables
Security design has become a large part of the recent theoretical corporate ﬁnance liter-
ature. The theoretical venture capital literature mentioned above emphasizes the double
moral hazard problem. It tries to explain how optimal contracts can address these incen-
tive problems. A common conclusion is that the use of convertible securities can improve
overall eﬃciency. The eﬀect on the eﬀort of the venture capitalist, however, can be am-
biguous. In addition to an eﬃciency eﬀect that increases eﬀort, convertible securities also
aﬀord the investor greater downside protection, which might decrease eﬀort. Our ﬁrst
contractual measure looks at the degree of downside protection that investors obtain from
the securities they use to ﬁnance the company.
Another important contractual component is whether investors hold control rights,
such as through direct participation on the board of directors. Hellmann (1998), for
example, shows that board control can be a prerequisite for venture capital support, since
without the control, the entrepreneur may hold up the value generated by the venture
capitalist. This suggests that more investor control is likely to increase investor eﬀort
provision. We capture this eﬀect by looking at whether the investor has a seat on the
company’s board of directors.
One may wonder why we treat board participation as an independent variable, rather
than as a dependent variable that measures yet another dimension of investor activism.
Indeed, some of the corporate ﬁnance literature equates board participation with active
investors. The problem with using board participation as a measure of activism, is that
one does not know how active or passive an investor actually behaves on the board. Board
participation only gives investors a formal role, whereas our analysis focuses on the real
role played by investors.6 Put diﬀerently, in our analysis we want to capture variation in
the real level of investor activism. By controlling for board participation we set ourselves
a more stringent standard for this, since we already eliminate any variation in investor
activism that is merely due to an investor’s formal role.
Venture capital deals are often syndicated among several investors (Brander, Amit
and Antweiler (2002), Lerner (1994)). Syndication is likely to reduce an investor’s activity
level, because of duplication of eﬀort, and possibly also because of free-riding. Partly as a
6Aghion and Tirole (1997) explain the importance of distingushing between formal and real control.
9response to this, syndicates delegate the responsibility for interacting with the company
to a syndicate leader, who is expected to remain more involved with the company. We
therefore control not only for whether a deal is syndicated or not, but also for whether
the venture ﬁrm is a leader or follower within the syndicate. Table 2(d) provides formal
deﬁnitions of all the contractual variables.
3.2.4 Motivating the company—level variables
Our regressions include a number of company-speciﬁc characteristics, which we deﬁne for-
mally in Table 2(e). We control for company age since younger companies are more likely
to need support and advice from the venture investor; this results in losing several observa-
tions but makes us more conﬁdent of our results. Since market conditions varied over the
time period we study we include year dummies to account for the date at which a company
received funding. We also control for the stage of the company. Early stage companies
are typically more resource constrained, and may beneﬁtm o r ef r o mt h ei n v o l v e m e n to f
the venture capital ﬁrm. Finally, we control for industry, since diﬀerent industries may




To explore our data and motivate our multivariate regression analysis, Table 4 provides
a set of univariate comparisons of the main dependent and independent variables. Table
4(a) focuses on how these variables vary with key attributes of venture ﬁrms, using the
venture ﬁrm as the unit of analysis. Table 4(b) focuses on how these variables vary with
key deal characteristics, using the portfolio company as the unit of analysis. In both
panels we report results for diﬀerence-of-means tests, but we obtain the same results with
diﬀerence-of-median tests.
Column (i) of Table 4(a) compares venture capital ﬁr m sw i t ha b o v ea n db e l o wm e d i a n
levels of their partners’ average business experience. This variable will play a key role
in our multivariate analysis, but we can already see that higher levels of business expe-
rience are associated with signiﬁcantly higher levels of investor activism, especially for
recruiting management, hiring directors and fundraising. The interaction variable shows
no signiﬁcant diﬀerence. The other rows look at venture capital ﬁrms’ attributes. Business
experience does not appear to be correlated with these attributes, except for a positive
correlation between business experience and science-education.
Column (ii) shows how the organizational form of venture capital ﬁr m sc o r r e l a t e sw i t h
the activity variables. Independent venture capital ﬁrms have higher levels of activism,
and these diﬀerences are statistically signiﬁcant (the directors variable is only marginally
insigniﬁcant at 13%).
Column (iii) compares younger with older venture capital ﬁrms, dividing them at the
sample median of 54 month. A unique feature of the European venture capital market
in the period under study, was the entry of many new venture capital ﬁrms. A natural
10question to ask is how this might aﬀect our analysis. We ﬁnd no strong diﬀerences for
investor activism: younger venture capital ﬁrms show slightly higher levels, but these
diﬀerences are all statistically insigniﬁcant. However, younger ﬁrms diﬀer in terms of other
characteristics. Not surprisingly, they have partners with less venture capital experience
and they are smaller. Moreover, there is a lower rate of successful exits among the younger
venture funds.
The exit rate of portfolio companies is the most common performance measure in
venture capital studies (Sørensen (2007)). Kaplan, Martel and Strömberg (2007) sug-
gest an additional performance measure, namely the survival rate of venture capital ﬁrms
themselves. This measure captures mainly long-term underperformance of venture capital
ﬁr m s ,a n di sb yc o n s t r u c t i o nl e s sﬁned-grained than the company exit rate. However, for
an analysis at the level of the venture capital ﬁrm, it provides a useful complementary
performance measure. Column (iv) distinguishes between those venture capital ﬁrms that
were still active in May 2007 from those which went out of business. We ﬁnd that the
survival of venture capital ﬁrms is clearly correlated with their exit rate of portfolio com-
panies. Not surprisingly, larger ﬁrms are also less likely to go out of business. Partners’
business experience is positively (and signiﬁcantly) associated with venture ﬁrm survival,
a ﬁnding which will remain central in our analysis. Note also that none of the activity
variables show any signiﬁcant correlation with ﬁrm survival. Below we will see that more
sophisticated models, which take account of selection at the company level, are necessary
to uncover performance eﬀects of investor activism.
Table 4(b) considers additional univariate comparisons using the portfolio company
as the unit of analysis. Our data covers the period 1998—2001, which witnessed a sharp
turn of the cycle for the venture capital industry. In the multivariate analysis we use
year ﬁxed eﬀects to account for this; in the univariate comparisons we divide our sample
into two subperiods, the ’boom’ period (1998 and 1999) versus the ’bust’ period (2000
and 2001). Column (i) shows the result. As expected, the exit rate is signiﬁcantly higher
for boom period deals. Larger and older venture ﬁrms, and ﬁrms with more experienced
partners were relatively more active in the boom period, whereas ﬁrms with more science-
educated partners were relatively more active in the bust period. Interestingly, most of
the activism variables do not show a clear cyclical behavior, the exception being that
interactions between investors and companies were more frequent in the bust period.
Column (ii) distinguishes early and late stage deals. In the multivariate analysis we
use a more ﬁne-grained set of dummy variables, but for the univariate analysis we deﬁne
’seed’ and ’start-up’ as early stage investments and ’expansion’ and ’bridge’ as late stage
investments.7 The table shows that staging is correlated with many investor attributes.
Larger ﬁrms, older ﬁrms, and ﬁrms with more experienced partners prefer later stage
deals, whereas ﬁrms with partners that have more business experience or science education
focus more on early stage deals. Investor activism is higher for early stage companies,
presumably because there is greater need for recruiting managers, hiring board members
and additional fundraising. The frequency of interaction appears comparable across early
7There is some ambiguity about the interpretation of the bridge stage, since in principle it is possible
to have bridge rounds even at an early stage of a company’s development. We reran all of the univariate
tests dropping the 24 bridge rounds from the sample, but found that this did not aﬀect any of our results.
11and late stages. As expected, the exit rate of late stage deals is signiﬁcantly higher.
Overall, the univariate analysis points to some key properties of the data and oﬀers
a ﬁr s tg l a n c ea ts o m eo ft h ec e n t r a lr e s u l t so ft h ep a p e r . W ea r en o wi nap o s i t i o nt o
proceed to multivariate regressions, which constitute the core of the analysis.
4.2 Multivariate analysis
All our dependent variables are binary, so we use a Probit model - all our results continue
to hold if we use a logit model - with the following speciﬁcation:
Yc = α + HiβH + RiβR + NcβN + XcβX + εc (1)
Variables indexed by c vary for every company whereas variables indexed by i vary for
every investor. Yc is the measure of investor activism (RECRUITING, DIRECTORS,
FUNDRAISING or INTERACTION) for the investment in company c by investor i. α is
an intercept. Hi is the vector of human capital measures for venture ﬁrm i (VENTURE-
EXPERIENCE, BUSINESS-EXPERIENCE, and SCIENCE-EDUCATION), and Ri is a
vector of organizational variables (INDEPENDENT—VC, VC—AGE and VC—SIZE) for ven-
ture ﬁrm i. Nc is a vector of contractual variables (DOWNSIDE, BOARD, SYNDICATE—
LEADER, and SYNDICATE—FOLLOWER) for investor i in company c. Xc is a vector
of variables (COMPANY—AGE. STAGE, DEAL—YEAR and INDUSTRY) which measure
characteristics of company c. Since our data consists of multiple investments made by
diﬀerent venture capital ﬁrms, we cluster our standard errors by venture capital ﬁrms i.
This allows for the error term εc to be correlated within the deals made by a venture
capital ﬁrm, thus imposing a conservative standard for accepting statistically signiﬁcant
results. Clustering implies the use of heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors.
Table 5 reports the results. The key insight is that human capital is an important
driver of the activities performed by venture capitalists. The most important human
capital factor is prior business experience, which is consistently positive and statistically
signiﬁcant for all activism variables. The eﬀect also has a large economic impact. Having
business experience increases the probability of investor being active between 21% and
46%.
Venture experience has almost no eﬀect, suggesting that job-speciﬁcl e a r n i n gi sn o t
a major determinant of the across-ﬁrms variation. Note that this does not imply that
venture experience is unimportant per se. In Section 7, for example, we identify that
venture experience plays an important role within venture capital ﬁrms.
Another interesting result is that science education has a negative and signiﬁcant
coeﬃcient in the INTERACTION regression. A reasonable conjecture for this ﬁnding is
as follows. Consider the trade-oﬀ between pre-investment screening activities and post-
investment monitoring activities. The negative coeﬃcient could be the result of a strategic
trade-oﬀ, where venture capital ﬁrms with strong science partners pursue a strategy of
focusing more on screening rather than monitoring activities.8
8While our data does not allow us to prove this conjecture directly, we provide two additional pieces
of indirect evidence to support it. First, the within-ﬁrm analysis of section 7 shows that partners with
science backgrounds are less likely to be put in charge of monitoring portfolio companies. Second, industry
12In terms of the organizational variables, the most important result is that being an
independent venture capital ﬁrm (INDEPENDENT—VC) consistently has a positive and
statistically signiﬁcant eﬀect. This eﬀect is also economically large, with increases in the
probability of investor activism ranging from 18% to 22%. Note that this constitutes a new
result in the venture capital literature, which is also consistent with the recent ﬁndings of
Masulis and Nahata (2007).
In addition we ﬁnd that VC—SIZE typically has a statistically insigniﬁcant coeﬃcient,
suggesting that larger venture ﬁrms do not behave signiﬁcantly diﬀerent than smaller ones.
VC—AGE matters mostly for fundraising, where the coeﬃcient is positive and signiﬁcant,
and for the interaction variable, where it is negative. One possible interpretation is that
older ﬁrms have more contacts with other venture capital ﬁrms, making them relatively
more eﬀective at fundraising (see Hochberg et. al. (2007)). They might thus spend less
time talking to the entrepreneurs, but more time talking about them to other investors.
In terms of contractual variables, the most important result is that BOARD consis-
tently has a positive and statistically signiﬁcant eﬀect. This result is very intuitive, since
board participation gives the investor a formal responsibility, that might include some of
the activities measured by our dependent variables. It also reinforces the point that the
results that we obtain for the human capital variables concern real eﬀects that go beyond
an investor’s formal role of sitting on the board of directors. Downside protection does not
have a statistically signiﬁcant eﬀect. Given our previous theoretical discussion, this is not
surprising. The LEADER variable is positive but always insigniﬁcant, implying that syn-
dicate leaders have comparable levels of activism than investor who invest by themselves.
The FOLLOWER variable is consistently negative, and statistically so for the RECRUIT-
ING and DIRECTORS, thus suggesting that followers in a syndicate exhibit lower levels
of activism. These results are consistent with theoretical models of syndication.
In terms of company controls, we ﬁnd that company age is always insigniﬁcant. The
stage controls, however, are important. Relative to the omitted category of seed invest-
ments, we ﬁnd that start-up and late stage investments receive signiﬁcantly lower level of
investor activism. There are only 24 bridge ﬁnancing deals, so that the coeﬃcient esti-
mates for this variable are not very consistent and are statistically weak. The year controls
are almost always insigniﬁcant, the only exception being that compared to the base year
of 1998, there was less recruiting in 2000.
5 Selection
A central concern in much of the corporate ﬁnance literature is to account for potential
selection biases. In our context, the question is whether the observed positive correlation
between business experience and investor activity, for example, might also be due to a
“selection” eﬀect where companies that desire more active investors are more likely to
match with more experienced investors. If this results in non-random it is possible that
observers typically argue that screening activities ism o r ei m p o r t a n ti nam a r k e td o w n t u r nt h a ni nam a r k e t
upturn. Section 8 discusses a robustness check, where we found that the negative coeﬃcient of science
education is mainly driven by the “bust” years (2000 and 2001), suggesting that the negative coeﬃcient
might be related to a greater emphasis on screening activities.
13the independent variables are correlated with the regression error term, leading to biased
estimates. Li and Prabhala (2006) provide an overview of the most common remedies used
in the corporate ﬁnance literature. To convince the reader that our results are robust to
selection issues, we examine several methods, and look at whether they deliver consistent
results.
5.1 Instrumental variables approach
The classical solution to the selection bias is based on instrumental variable (IV hence-
forth) regressions. Some recent examples in the corporate ﬁnance literature include Berger
et. al. (2005) and Faulkender and Petersen (2005) and Hellmann, Lindsey and Puri
(2007).9 In our case the appropriate instrumental variable must be independent of the
outcome equation but should be related to the venture capitalists’ business experience. A
common choice of instruments is to use measures of the local availability of the selected
characteristic–business experience in our context. Consider two diﬀerent markets, one
with many experienced investors, the other with few. A company’s actual choice of in-
vestor may be endogenous, but the local availability of experienced investors is exogenous.
Moreover, once a company is matched with its investor, the local availability of experienced
investors becomes irrelevant, since all that matters is the experience of the investor who
was actually chosen. Hence it is reasonable to use local availability of investor experience
as an instrument for the selection equation.10 This approach closely mirrors the analysis
of Berger et. al. (2005), who instrument an individual bank’s size with the median size of
banks in the local market.
We therefore estimate an IV Probit regression where the main regression is the same as
in (1), except that BUSINESS-EXPERIENCE is now instrumented by LOCAL-BUSINESS-
EXPERIENCE. This is deﬁned as a fraction, where the denominator measures the number
of deals in our dataset that are made in the company’s country, and where the numerator
measures how many of these deals were made by a venture capital ﬁrm that has at least
one partner with prior business experience. For this calculation we exclude the observation
itself from both the numerator and denominator, so as not to use an observation as its
own instrument.
Panel A of Table 6 shows the results. We note that accounting for potential endogeneity
does not change the statistical signiﬁcance of business experience. In fact, adding the
s e l e c t i o ne q u a t i o nh a r d l ya ﬀects the main model at all. Interestingly, the estimates of
the coeﬃcient of correlation between the error term of the structural equation and the error
term of the reduced form equation for the endogenous variable are not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent
from zero, suggesting that selection does not interfere much with the outcome equations.
9The IV approach is closely related to the selection-treatment model of Heckman (1979), which in the
corporate ﬁnance literature has been used, among others, by Baker and Hubbard (2003), Bris, Zhu and
Welch (2005), Campa and Kedia (2002), Hellmann and Puri (2002), and Villalonga and Amit (2006). In
unreported regressions we veriﬁed that all of our IV results hold also in the Heckman selection-treatment
model.
10As with any exclusion restriction, it is always possible to ﬁnd some hypothetical reason why the
outcome may still depend on the proposed instrument. In our case, one could conceive externalities where
the experience of excluded investors still matters after the deal is done. However, there is no evidence or
industry-held belief that such externalities exist, suggesting that the exclusion restriction is reasonable.
14The only exception is for the INTERACTION regression, where there is some evidence
of selection. However, the eﬀect of BUSINESS-EXPERIENCE still remains intact after
controlling for selection. We also note that LOCAL-BUSINESS-EXPERIENCE is highly
signiﬁcant and has the expected positive sign, validating that it is a relevant instrument.
As t r e n g t ho fI Vr e g r e s s i o n si st h a tt h e ya r er e l a t i v e l ys i m p l ea n dw i d e l yu s e d . A
weakness is that they require a fairly narrow speciﬁcation of how endogenous selection
takes place. In particular, they assume that companies select investors based on a single
characteristic, business experience in our case. In reality, the process by which companies
and investors are matched may be more complex, and may involve several investor and
company characteristics. We therefore consider two additional approaches that allow for
a richer selection model.
5.2 Ackerman and Botticini approach
In their seminal paper, Ackerman and Botticini (2002) (A—B henceforth) propose an alter-
native method for identifying selection eﬀects. They derive a richer identiﬁcation strategy,
where the selection of a principal (investor in our context) and of an agent (company in our
context) depends on all their potentially relevant characteristics that may be unobserved,
partially observed, or observed with error by the econometrician. Their approach involves
estimation of a more general matching equation that describes how principals and agents
are matched with each other, which takes into account multiple investor characteristics.
A—B also argue that the distribution of local market characteristics is exogenous, and
then use a broader set of geography-based instruments. Intuitively, the argument is that
whether a particular company is matched with a particular investor depends not only on
the local availability of investor types (e.g., availability of experienced investors), but also
on the distribution of companies in that local market (e.g., number of companies seeking
experienced investors). In this case the matching equation should diﬀer across markets.
A—B suggest using market ﬁxed eﬀects–which subsumes the previous approach of using
local investor characteristics–as well as ﬁxed eﬀects for each type of company-market
interaction.
Our data contains 17 domestic markets, 12 industries and 4 investment stages, resulting
in a large number of interaction terms: 270 = 17 × 12 − 1+1 7× 4 − 1.W eu s ea l lt h e s e
to instrument our six investor characteristics (three human capital variables and three
organizational variables, see Tables 2(b) and 2(c)). Ideally one would like to estimate an
IV Probit, which is a non-linear regression model. However, given the large number of
instruments and variables to be instrumented, it is not surprising that such a large non-
linear system fails to achieve numerical convergence. We therefore examine the equivalent
linear probability model.11 Panel B of Table 6 reports the results. These are very similar
11This follows A—B, who demonstrate all their results with a linear probability model, and then show
that the non-linear Probit model achieves the same results. In unreported regressions we also re-estimated
the base model with a linear probability model. While the coeﬃcient values of the linear model are not
directly comparable to those of the non-linear model, we may still compare their statistical signiﬁcance.
Comparing thus the results with those of Table 5 reveals that the linear probability model generates very
similar results to the Probit speciﬁcation. Indeed, the signiﬁcance levels of the main variables are almost
identical in the two models. This reduces any concerns about using the linear probability model for the
estimation of our matching models.
15to those of Panel A of Table 6, as well as those of the base model reported in Table 5.
This is an important result, since the A-B model uses a much larger set of instruments
and controls for potential selection eﬀects on all six investor characteristics.
5.3 Sørensen-Heckman approach
Our ﬁnal approach of estimating the selection equation is based on combining insights from
the recent work of Sørensen (2007), and the Heckman (1979) sample selection model. We
call this the Sørensen-Heckman (S—H henceforth) approach. Sørensen (2007) introduces
an alternative perspective on the matching process between companies and investors. He
exploits the characteristics of all agents in the market by considering not only the realized
matches, but all potential matches, including unrealized ones. Speciﬁcally, he deﬁn e sa st h e
unit of observation the potential match between an individual company and an individual
investor. He then estimates a selection model that explains which potential matches are
actually formed. This methodology generalizes existing models by allowing for a richer
interaction between the choices made by diﬀerent agents. The matching model controls
for the sorting and the selection of the observed investments to obtain unbiased estimates
of the outcome equation. Because of assumptions speciﬁc to his context, Sørensen uses a
Bayesian approach to estimate his system of equations. We prefer the classical approach of
estimating a system of two equations. With the distinction between potential and realized
matches, our data structure corresponds exactly to the sample selection model of Heckman
(1979).
To implement the S—H model, we ﬁrst construct the sample of all possible company-
investor matches. After eliminating those potential matches where the company was rais-
ing money before the investor was in operation, as well as matches with missing infor-
mation, we have 98,356 potential matches. For the selection equation, we build on the
identiﬁcation strategy of Sørensen, who argues that the distribution of companies and
investors in the various markets is exogenous. We could characterize these exogenous
market characteristics by simply including country ﬁxed eﬀects; since these contain any
eﬀects of local business experience, they already capture the identiﬁcation strategy of
the IV model. However, the S—H model allows for an even more powerful identiﬁcation
strategy, since it can account for the distribution of investors by using the joint distrib-
utions of the company’s and investor’s countries through country-pair ﬁxed eﬀects. To
this purpose we deﬁne a dummy variable for each pair of company and investor country.
In addition to these market characteristics, matching may also depend on company and
investor characteristics themselves. We therefore include our six investor characteristics
and three company characteristics (age, stage and sector) in the selection equation. Panel
C of Table 6 reports the results. Once again we ﬁnd that accounting for selection does not
change the signiﬁcance of all the main explanatory variables. Given that the S—H model
uses a very general structure to account for the matching process, this is an important
ﬁnding. It conﬁrms that our analysis of selection eﬀects is not sensitive to the econometric
details of how selection is being accounted for.
As a further robustness check, we consider our assumption of market segmentation.
While the majority of deals are domestic, our data also includes some companies that were
ﬁnanced by foreign investors. We therefore reran the S—H model, dropping all foreign deals,
16and ﬁnd that all the main results continue to hold. Taken together, the results of Table
6 thus provide persuasive evidence that the main results of Table 5 are not driven by
selection.12
6E x i t p e r f o r m a n c e
The analysis so far focuses on the determinants of investor activism. This is an important
question by itself, but it also ties into the bigger question of how activism aﬀects perfor-
mance outcomes. Prior work establishes that venture capital backed companies achieve
superior performance (Hellmann and Puri (2000, 2002)), and proposes investor activism
as a likely explanation. In this paper we measure investor activism directly. Therefore, we
can ask to what extent greater activism is associated with better performance outcomes.
This involves two research challenges: measurement and identiﬁcation.
The ﬁrst challenge is performance measurement. It is well known that venture cap-
ital ﬁrms are reluctant to disclose their returns and that there is no publicly available
source of return data. The venture capital literature therefore relies on ’exits’–IPOs or
acquisitions–as a measure of performance (Gompers and Lerner (2000), Brander, Amit
and Antweiler (2002)). This is an imperfect measure of performance, to the extent that it
doesn’t account for investment costs or ownership stakes. However, the few studies that
look at proprietary returns data (Cochrane (2005), Kaplan and Schoar (2005)) conﬁrm
that most of the returns come from these exit events. The exits easiest to measure are
IPOs. However, Brander, Egan and Hellmann (2005) show, in the North American con-
text, that IPOs constitute only 25% of exits by number (60% by value), the rest being
acquisitions. The approach we adopt in this paper is to collect data on both IPOs and
acquisitions. Our main dependent variable is EXIT, which takes the value 1 if a company
goes public or is acquired; 0 otherwise.
The second research challenge is identiﬁcation. Investor activism may not be random,
and the analysis of Section 4 already identiﬁes some determinants of activism. A sim-
ple regression of investor activism on exit performance may therefore fail to account for
endogenous eﬀects. In this context, endogeneity concerns reverse causality, whereby unob-
served performance-related company characteristics induce investors to become more (or
less) active. For example, the company may face operational problems, unobservable to
the econometrician, that decrease company performance. These problems may also trigger
more investor activism, because the company needs more help from investors. We control
for such eﬀects by estimating the following system of two equations that determines both
investor activism and exit performance:
Yc = αY + HiβH + RiβR + NcβN + XcβX + εc
Ec = αE + Ycγc + NcγN + XcγX + ηc
(2)
12In unreported regressions we also consider an additional permutation of the selection equation for
the S—H model, which mimics the identiﬁcation strategy of the A—B model. In the selection equation we
include company-level country-industry and country-stage interactions. The results of this speciﬁcation
are very similar to those reported in Panel C of Table 6, conﬁrming that the results are robust to various
ways of specifying the selection equation.
17where variables are deﬁn e da si nS e c t i o n4 ,a n dEc measures the exit performance (EXIT)
for company c. The important assumption is that the error terms εc and ηc may be
correlated, due to unobservable ﬁrm characteristics such as the operational problems in
the example above. As before, we cluster standard errors by venture capital ﬁrm.
The main variable of interest for the performance equation is investor activism. The
performance equation also includes the contractual and company characteristics, recog-
nizing that companies in diﬀerent industries or diﬀerent stages may have diﬀerent success
probabilities. The equation for investor activism is the same as equation (1). The key
identiﬁcation assumption is that investor characteristics aﬀect activism, but not perfor-
mance. This follows from the literature on investor activism, which argues that company
managers determine performance, but that investors contribute through their monitoring,
support and control activities (Becht, Bolton, and Röell (2003)). The eﬀect of investors
on performance is thus an indirect eﬀect that goes through their activities. This indirect
eﬀect is precisely what is captured by the above system of equations.
Panel A of Table 7 reports the results of a simple Probit regression for exit performance.
All our measures of activism are insigniﬁcant. This may be due to the fact that the simple
regression model cannot account for issues of reverse causality.
Panel B of Table 7 estimates the system of two equations speciﬁed in (2), using an IV
Probit model. The results conﬁrm that controlling for endogeneity is important. We ﬁnd
that investor activism has a positive and signiﬁcant eﬀect on exit performance in three out
of four models. In these models the estimate of ρ, which measures the correlation of the
error terms across the two equations, is negative and signiﬁcant. This means that there is
negative reverse causality, i.e., investor activism occurs more frequently with companies
that have performance challenges. However, once we control for this, we ﬁnd that investor
activism has a positive eﬀect on performance. These results apply to the RECRUIT-
MENT, DIRECTORS and FUNDRAISING variables. The exception is INTERACTION,
where the eﬀect on performance remains statistically insigniﬁcant even after controlling for
endogeneity. We interpret this results as saying that communication by itself does not in-
crease performance. Such improvements arise only from activities where investors actually
garner additional resources (managers, board members, ﬁnancing) for the company.
Panels A and B of Table 7 focus on the system of two equations (2) for investor
activism and exit performance. In Section 5, we also considered the possibility of selection
eﬀects for how investors and companies are matched in the ﬁrst place. While we did
not ﬁnd strong evidence for such selection eﬀects, we may still want to examine whether
the results for the relationship between activism and exit might be aﬀected by any such
selection eﬀects. The estimation of models with both selection eﬀects and systems of
endogenous equations poses some econometric challenges. Woodridge (2002) discusses
these challenges and suggests the following procedure (see page 568). In a ﬁrst step, use
a selection equation to estimate an inverse Mills ratio. This is the standard measure of
selection bias in Heckman-type selection models. In the second step, include the estimated
inverse Mills ratio as an independent variable into all of the equations of the endogenous
system. Woodridge then explains that the null hypothesis of no selection eﬀects can be
tested using standard t-tests for the coeﬃcients of the inverse Mills ratio.
We implement this approach as follows. Of the three selection models in Section 5,
18the S—H model is the only one to have the appropriate binary structure for the selection
equation. It also contains a very comprehensive speciﬁcation of a selection equation. Thus
we use the S—H model to estimate the inverse Mills ratio. We then include this estimate
into both equations of (2). Panel C of Table 7 reports the results from this approach,
which we call the ’IV—cum—Mills’ approach.
Comparing Panels B and C we immediately note that most coeﬃcients are very similar.
This suggests that the inclusion of selection eﬀects does not seem to interfere with the basic
relationship between activism and exit performance. Next, we note that the Mills ratios
are always insigniﬁcant in both the exit and the activism equations. Thus, for all the
regression models, we cannot reject the null hypothesis of no selection eﬀects.
We subject these ﬁndings to a series of robustness checks. We start by considering
a narrower measure of performance, based only on IPOs, but excluding acquisitions. In
unreported regressions we reran the analysis of Table 7 with IPOs as the dependent vari-
able, and found that our results for activism are not aﬀected. We then verify that the
result of Panel A are not due to the simple Probit structure, and examine two alterna-
tive speciﬁcation. First, we consider a Cox duration model to measure time—to—exit. We
ﬁnd that recruiting managers, hiring directors and helping with fundraising all have an
insigniﬁcant eﬀect on time-to-exit, while the interaction variable comes out negative and
signiﬁcant. This last result is consistent with venture capitalists spending more time with
companies that are not on a clear path to a fast exit. Second, we consider an alternative
speciﬁcation based on propensity scores. This approach has been used in the corporate
ﬁnance literature by Bottazzi and Da Rin (2002), Drucker and Puri (2006), and Villalonga
(2004). As emphasized by Li and Prabhala (2006), this provides a richer way of controlling
for observable characteristics, although it does not account for correlation with unobserv-
ables. In unreported regressions we found that the propensity scoring method yields very
similar results to the simple Probit model.
Concerning the interpretation of our main result, one may ask the following question.
If the structure of venture capital ﬁrms aﬀects activism and ultimately company perfor-
mance, what prevents these ﬁrms from always adopting the most successful structure?
For example, why doesn’t every venture capital ﬁrm simply hire some partners with prior
business experience? It is important to realize that our analysis does not invite such a
conclusion. Our results do not imply that anybody with prior business experience would
make a good venture capitalist. They only show that people who become venture capi-
talist and had prior business experience are mor ea c t i v ei n v e s t o r s ,w h i c hi nt u r ni m p r o v e s
company performance. These results can be interpreted as an equilibrium outcome of an
economy where there is a limited supply of talented venture capitalists with prior business
experience.
7 Within-ﬁrm analysis
7.1 Which partners are most active?
Our results so far show the importance of human capital for investor activism across
venture capital ﬁrms. But does human capital also play a role within venture capital
ﬁrms? Our data allow us to push the analysis one step further in this direction. In our
19survey, we gathered additional data on which partner(s) is in charge of which company,
obtaining information for about 80% of our observations. There are two issues we explore
with these data.
The ﬁrst issue is how human capital aﬀects variation in activism within the same ﬁrm.
This is a diﬀerent question than what we asked before. In Section 4 we were concerned with
how diﬀerences in the average human capital proﬁles aﬀected activism across ﬁrms. In this
Section we deliberately ignore all diﬀerences across ﬁrms, and focus only on within-ﬁrm
variation, asking whether human capital can explain diﬀerences in the level of activism
a company receives, compared to other companies ﬁnanced by the same venture ﬁrm.
Therefore the within-ﬁrm analysis does not replicate the across-ﬁrms analysis, but adds
some additional insights.
For the estimation of within-ﬁrm eﬀects, we use the following conditional logit model:
Yc = α + HciβH + NcβN + XcβX + FEiβF + εc (3)
where the variables are the same as in equation (1), with two diﬀerences. First, we now
have a diﬀerent measure of human capital. Hci is the vector of human capital measures
for the partner(s) at ﬁrm i in charge of company c (PIC-VENTURE-EXPERIENCE,
PIC-BUSINESS-EXPERIENCE, and PIC-SCIENCE-EDUCATION). This diﬀers from
our main measure of human capital (Hi in (1)),which is the average across all partners of
av e n t u r eﬁrm.13 Second, the vector or investor characteristics Ri is now superseded by
FEi, a vector of investor ﬁxed eﬀects.
Table 8 reports the results from the conditional logit model. Note that all the obser-
vations where there is no within-ﬁrm variation are dropped, explaining the lower number
of observations. Once again we ﬁnd that human capital matters: venture experience has a
positive and signiﬁcant eﬀect on all the activism variables. This result reveals that, within
ﬁrms, venture experience aﬀects the level of activism of the individual partners. However,
this eﬀect seems to apply across all venture ﬁrms, so that we could not pick it up in the
across-ﬁrms analysis. The within-ﬁrms analysis therefore complements the across-ﬁrms
approach.14 Another interesting result is that business experience is no longer signiﬁcant
at the within-ﬁrms level. One possible interpretation of this result is that business expe-
rience is relatively easily shared among partners in a ﬁrm, and therefore does not matter
in the within-ﬁrm regressions.
7.2 Which partners get put in charge?
The second issue we explore is which partner gets put in charge when a ﬁrm makes an
investment in a company. Being put in charge gives a partner the primary responsibility
for interfacing with the ﬁrm. Theoretical models suggest that managers with more skills
13We obtain the necessary data from an additional question from our survey, which asked (for each com-
pany): Which partner(s)/senior manager(s) has/had responsibility for monitoring this company? While
typically a single partner is put in charge of a deal, in 15% of the cases more than one partner is put in
charge.
14O n ec a v e a ti st h a tw h e nw ee s t i m a t et h em o d e l so fTable 8 as linear probability regressions with
ﬁxed eﬀects, we ﬁnd that venture experience continues to be signiﬁcant in the fundraising and interaction
regressions, but becomes insigniﬁcant in the recruiting and directors regressions.
20are given more responsibility (Rosen (1982), Garicano (1990)). We then ask whether
human capital matters for the allocation of tasks within venture capital ﬁrms.
Examining this requires a diﬀerent data construction. Our unit of observation now
becomes the potential match between a partner in a venture ﬁrm and a company ﬁnanced
by that ﬁrm. A match is realized if the speciﬁc partner is in put in charge of the speciﬁc
company, and unrealized otherwise. Note that these potential matches between a ﬁrm’s
individual venture partners and its portfolio companies are entirely diﬀerent from the
potential matches we considered in Section 5, which were between all companies and all
venture capital ﬁrms. Our dependent variable is IN-CHARGE, which takes the value
1 if there is a realized match; 0 otherwise. The independent variables are the same as
before, except that human capital is now measured at the individual partner level, whether
or not put in charge of a company. We denote these individual-partner-level variables
with IP-VENTURE-EXPERIENCE, IP-BUSINESS-EXPERIENCE, and IP-SCIENCE-
EDUCATION. Since for every company there are several potential partners, the number
of observation increases, relative to the base dataset.
To obtain our estimates we use the following conditional logit model:
Ip = α + HpβH + NcβN + XcβX + FEiβF + εp.( 4 )
The index p indicates that a variables varies at the level of the individual venture partner.
Ip is the dependent variable (IN-CHARGE), which measures whether or not partner p has
been put in charge of company c. Hp is the vector of human capital measures for each
individual partner p. The remaining variables are as before.
Table 9 reports the results. Once again, we ﬁnd that human capital matters. Partners
with prior business experience are signiﬁcantly more likely to be put in charge of an in-
vestment. In addition, we ﬁnd that also venture experience has a positive and statistically
signiﬁcant eﬀect on task-allocation: the longer a partner’s experience in venture capital,
the more likely that s/he will be put in charge of an investment. The eﬀect of a science ed-
ucation is negative and statistically insigniﬁcant. These results complement our previous
analysis, showing yet another facet of how human capital aﬀects investor activities.15
8 Extensions and robustness checks
A growing literature focuses on the characteristics of corporate (Gompers and Lerner
(2000)) and bank-related venture capital ﬁrms (Hellmann, Lindsey and Puri (2007)). So
far we have distinguished between independent and so-called ’captive’ funds. We now
look at what additional insights can be gained by diﬀerentiating among the three types of
captive venture funds, namely corporate, bank and public venture funds. Panel A of Table
10 provides separate univariate tests for each of the three captive types, the comparison
category being independent venture funds. Banks provide lower levels of activism, with the
diﬀerence being signiﬁcant except for fundraising. Corporates also provide lower levels of
activism, but the diﬀerence is signiﬁcant only for fundraising. Public venture ﬁrms provide
lower levels of activism, but the diﬀerences are not signiﬁcant, which may be due to the
15We also estimated the models of Table 9 as linear probability regressions with ﬁxed eﬀects, and found
analogous results.
21low number of observations in this category. In terms of exits, we notice no signiﬁcant
diﬀerences, except that public venture ﬁrms are associated with considerable fewer exits.
An unreported Kruskal—Wallis test of the diﬀerence of median conﬁrms that the three
types of captive ﬁrms diﬀer (at 5%) for all variables except fundraising. In terms of other
ﬁrm characteristics we notice that bank ﬁrms tend to be larger. Curiously, none of the
public venture ﬁrms have partners with science education.
We then ran additional regressions breaking out the captive types in the model of
Table 5. We use the independent venture ﬁrms as the omitted category and estimate
separate coeﬃcients for the three captive types. Panel B shows the results in abbreviated
format, focusing only on the three coeﬃcients of interest. The other coeﬃcients not
reported in Panel B of Table 10 are very similar to those of Table 5. As expected, all the
coeﬃcients of the captives are negative or else insigniﬁcant. Banks are less active in hiring
directors. Corporate venture ﬁrms do the same, and also get less involved with recruiting
management. Public venture ﬁrms have fewer interactions with the entrepreneurs.
Hellmann and Puri (2002) note that when venture capitalists support the profession-
alization of their companies, they are not only concerned with recruiting chief executive
oﬃcers (CEOs), but also become involved more deeply with building an entire management
team. Our survey therefore asked additional detail about the role of venture capitalists
in recruiting for speciﬁc positions within the company, namely CEOs, CFOs, VPs of mar-
keting and heads of R&D. In unreported Probit regressions we ﬁnd that our results on
human capital continue to hold for all of these management positions, suggesting that the
role of venture capital activism goes deep into the organization of portfolio companies.
A central ﬁnding of this paper is that prior business experience is important for investor
activism. The main other types of experience held by venture partners in our dataset are
ﬁnance and accounting. We can thus ask whether this alternative experience also matters
for investor activism. In unreported regressions we add the venture ﬁrm’s prior experience
in ﬁnance and accounting. We ﬁnd that this variable is never signiﬁcant, nor does it alter
the importance of business experience.
We examined whether the importance of venture capital ﬁrm characteristics varied over
the cycle. In unreported regressions we estimated each of the venture capital variables
separately for the boom and bust periods (see also Section 4.1). Overall we ﬁnd that
cyclical eﬀects do not have an important eﬀect on the relationship between venture ﬁrm
characteristics and investor activism. The only variable that is aﬀected by the cycle is
INTERACTION. Science education is negative and signiﬁcant for the bust but not the
boom period; independent venture capital ﬁr m si sp o s i t i v ea n ds i g n i ﬁcant for the bust but
not the boom period; and venture experience is positive and signiﬁcant for the boom but
not the bust period.
Theory suggests that the size of an investor’s equity stake aﬀects the incentives to
be involved with a company. Unfortunately, investors consider the size of their stakes
sensitive and conﬁdential information, and we were unable to obtain any information on
them. However, for about 60% of all companies, we have information on the amount that
av e n t u r eﬁrm invested in the company. We expect that investing larger amounts of money
is correlated with larger ownership stakes. In unreported regression we ﬁnd that adding
the natural logarithm of the amount invested to our regression does not change our basic
22results. The coeﬃcient on the amount variable is itself positive and signiﬁcant for the
DIRECTORS and RECRUITING regressions.
Our data covers a total of seventeen diﬀerent countries. In a companion paper we
investigate the importance of a country’s legal system on venture capital investing (Bot-
tazzi, Da Rin, and Hellmann (2007)). For this paper, we consider two simple extensions.
We group countries by legal origin (LaPorta et. al.(1998)), using both a company’s and
an investor’s legal system of origin. And we use individual country dummies. In all
these regressions we ﬁnd that our results for activism are not aﬀected by these additional
controls.
To construct our INTERACTION variable we pooled weekly and monthly commu-
nication, and we pooled quarterly and annual communication. To make full use of the
information we have, and be sure that pooling has no eﬀect on our results, we also estimate
ordered Probit models with the disaggregated information, where the dependent variable
is an ordered categorical variable for annual, quarterly, monthly, or weekly communication.
We found that pooling did not aﬀect any of our results.
In the construction of our DOWNSIDE measure we have used the information on the
entire set of securities used to ﬁnance a deal. In our survey we also asked which security
was the most important in the deal, i.e., we asked what the main security used was. We
make use of this additional information and modify our downside measure to include only
the main security used. Using this alternative measure, however, does not aﬀect any of
our results.
We already discussed that our sample is unusually large, and that it closely matches
population characteristics. As with any other hand-collected data, and in spite of a major
eﬀort to ﬁll as many gaps as possible, we still end up with some missing observations
on some variables. To verify that our data do not suﬀer from sample selectivity bias we
estimate a Heckman sample selection model, using the maximum likelihood approach.
None of our regressions appear to be aﬀected by this, suggesting that it is unlikely that
our results are aﬀected by sample selection problems.
As a further check on sample selectivity bias, we run our regressions on a sample
restricted to those companies for which we have complete information. Using such a sample
provides consistency across regressions, but discards potentially useful information. In any
case, we ﬁnd that our results continue to hold in this more restrictive sample.
9C o n c l u s i o n
In this paper we use a hand-collected sample of European venture capital deals to examine
the determinants and consequences of investor activism. We ﬁnd that prior business ex-
perience is an important predictor or an active investment style. Organizational structure
also matters, especially whether a venture capital ﬁrm is structured as an independent
entity. These results are remarkably robust across a wide variety of speciﬁcations, in-
cluding models which account for endogenous matching of companies and investors. We
also establish a positive relationship between investor activism and the success of portfo-
lio companies, a ﬁnding which highlights the economic importance of human capital for
ﬁnancial intermediation. The analysis suggests avenues for future research. The ﬁnan-
23cial intermediation literature focusses mostly on the eﬀects of contracts and organization.
Our results suggest that human capital considerations might be under-appreciated in this
literature.
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29Table 1: Sample properties
This table compares our sample to the population it is drawn from. Panel A looks at the country composition
and response rates, Panel B at the composition by venture ﬁrm type, and Panel C at the size composition.
Variables are deﬁned in Table 2. Partners are measured in units, the amount managed in million of current
euros.
Panel A: COUNTRY COMPOSITION AND RESPONSE RATE
POPULATION SAMPLE RESPONSE RATE
Austria 23 8 34.8%
Belgium 34 4 11.8%
Denmark 29 4 13.8%
Finland 33 6 18.2%
France 101 14 13.9%
Germany 146 19 13.0%
Greece 8 4 50.0%
Ireland 15 3 20.0%
Italy 37 5 13.5%
Luxembourg 3 1 33.3%
The Netherlands 52 4 7.7%
Norway 22 2 9.1%
Portugal 10 2 20.0%
Spain 38 10 26.3%
Sweden 17 6 35.3%
Switzerland 43 6 14.0%
UK 139 21 15.1%
TOTAL 750 119 15.8%






Panel C: COMPOSITION BY SIZE
POPULATION
Mean Median Min. Max.
Number of partners 4.3 3 1 25
Amount managed 333.4 60 1 14,200
SAMPLE
Mean Median Min. Max.
Number of partners 4.2 3 1 20
Amount managed 182.8 50 2 4,500Table 2: Variable deﬁnitions
Table 2(a): Dependent variables
These variables are measured at the portfolio company level.
Variable Description
RECRUITING dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the venture capital ﬁrm is re-
ported to be involved in recruiting senior management for the company;
0 otherwise. We obtain the data from our survey instrument, which
asked: Has your ﬁrm been involved in recruiting senior management for
this company? Possible answers were: Yes, No.
DIRECTORS dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the venture capital ﬁrm is
reported to be involved in the hiring of outside directors of the company;
0 otherwise. We obtain the data from our survey instrument, which
asked: Has your ﬁrm been involved in hiring some of this company’s
outside directors? Possible answers were: Yes, No.
FUNDRAISING dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the venture capital ﬁrm is
reported to be help the company obtain additional ﬁnancing; 0 otherwise.
We obtain the data from our survey instrument, which asked: Has your
ﬁrm helped this company obtain additional ﬁnancing? Possible answers
were: Yes, No.
INTERACTION dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the venture capital ﬁrm is
reported to interact with the company on a monthly or weekly basis; 0
if it interacts with on an annual or quarterly basis. We obtain the data
from our survey instrument, which asked: How many times per year
does (did) the responsible partner(s)/manager(s) personally interact with
this company? (check one). Possible answers were: annually; quarterly;
monthly; weekly.
EXIT dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the company has been acquired
or has been listed through an Initial Public Oﬀering; 0 otherwise. We
measure exits at December 2005, and we obtain the data from a variety
of sources described in Section 2.Table 2(b): Independent variables: Human capital characteristics
These variables are measured at both the venture ﬁrm level and at the portfolio company level. We denote
the latter case with the preﬁx’ P I C . ’
Variable Description
VENTURE-EXPERIENCE logarithm of the average number of years experience in venture
capital of the venture ﬁrm’s partners. We obtain the data from
our survey instrument, which asked (for each partner/senior man-
ager): Indicate the years of experience as venture capitalist.
BUSINESS-EXPERIENCE fraction of the venture ﬁrm’s partners who have prior business
experience. We obtain the data from our survey instrument, which
asked (for each partner/senior manager): Indicate the professional
background (multiple answers possible). Possible answers were:
ﬁnance; industry (including previous entrepreneurial experience);
accounting; consulting; legal; other (specify).
SCIENCE-EDUCATION fraction of the venture ﬁrm’s partners who have an education in
science or engineering. We obtain the data from our survey in-
strument, which asked (for each partner/senior manager): Indi-
cate the ﬁeld of education (multiple answers possible). Possible
answers were: business; humanities; engineering/science; law and
social sciences; other (specify).
Table 2(c): Independent variables: Organizational characteristics
These variables are measured at the portfolio company level.
Variable Description
INDEPENDENT-VC dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the venture capitalist
deﬁnes itself as an independent venture ﬁrm; 0 otherwise.
VC—AGE logarithm of the age of the venture capital ﬁrm, measured in
months at the end of the sample period. We obtain the data
from our survey instrument, which asked: Indicate the date of
creation of your ﬁrm (mm/yy).
VC—SIZE logarithm of the amount under management of the venture capital
ﬁrm at the end of the sample period, in millions of current euros.
We obtain the data by contacting directly respondent companies
after receiving their main answers. or from commercial databases,
company websites and industry sources.Table 2(d): Independent variables: Contractual characteristics
These variables are measured at the portfolio company level. In the instructions to the survey we speciﬁed
functional deﬁnitions of these diﬀerent ﬁnancial instruments in order to ensure consistency of responses.
Variable Description
DOWNSIDE dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the instruments used
for ﬁnancing the company includes one of the following: straight
debt, convertible debt or preferred equity; 0 otherwise. We obtain
the data from our survey instrument, which asked: Which of the
following ﬁnancial instruments has your ﬁrm used to ﬁnance this
company? Possible answers were: common equity; straight debt;
convertible debt; preferred equity; warrants.
BOARD dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the venture capital ﬁrm
is reported to sit or have sat on the board of directors of the
company; 0 otherwise. We obtain the data from our survey in-
strument, which asked: Is (or was) your ﬁrm represented on this
company’s board of directors? Possible answers were: Yes, No.
NO—SYNDICATE dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the company is ﬁnanced
by a single investor; 0 otherwise. We obtain the data from our sur-
vey instrument, which asked: Was the deal syndicated? Possible
answers were: Yes; No.
SYNDICATE—LEADER dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the company is ﬁnanced
with a syndicated deal and the venture capital ﬁrm is the leader
of the syndicate; 0 otherwise. We obtain the data from our survey
instrument, which asked: If the deal was syndicated, was your ﬁrm
the lead investor? Possible answers were: Yes; No.
SYNDICATE—FOLLOWER dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the company is ﬁnanced
with a syndicated deal and the venture capital ﬁrm is not the
leader of the syndicate; 0 otherwise. We obtain the data from our
survey instrument, which asked: If the deal was syndicated, was
your ﬁrm the lead investor? Possible answers were: Yes; No.Table 2(e): Independent variables: Company characteristics
Variable Description
COMPANY—AGE logarithm of the age of the company, measured in months at the
time of funding. We obtain the data from our survey instrument,
which asked (for each company): Indicate the date of creation of
the company (mm/yy),a n d Indicate the date of your ﬁrst round
of ﬁnancing to this company (mm/yy).
STAGE—DUMMIES set of four dummy variables each of which takes the value 1 if
a deal is reported as seed, start-up, expansion, or bridge (re-
spectively); 0 otherwise. We obtain the data from our survey
instrument, which asked: Indicate the type of your ﬁrst round
of ﬁnancing to this company (check one). Possible answers were:
Seed; Start-up; Expansion; and Bridge.
DEAL—YEAR set of four dummy variables each of which takes the value 1 if
a deal took place in 1998, 1999, 2000, or 2001 (respectively); 0
otherwise. We obtain the data from our survey instrument, which
asked: Indicate the date of your ﬁrst round of ﬁnancing to this
company (mm/yy).
INDUSTRY set of a mutually exclusive dummy variables that take the value
1 if the company is reported to operate in one the following in-
dustries; 0 otherwise. We obtain the data from our survey instru-
ment, which gave the following options: Biotech and pharma;
Medical products; Software and internet; Financial services; In-
dustrial services; Electronics; Consumer services; Telecom; Food
and consumer goods; Industrial products (incl. energy); Media &
Entertainment; Other.Table 3: Descriptive statistics
This table provides descriptive statistics for all our dependent and independent variables. Variables are
deﬁned in Table 2. For dummy variables the MEAN column reports the frequency of observations, and the
MEDIAN is omitted.
VARIABLE MEAN MEDIAN MIN MAX OBS
Recruiting 0.482 — 0 1 1,548
Directors 0.407 — 0 1 1,523
Fundraising 0.521 — 0 1 1,481
Interaction 0.693 — 0 1 1,466
Exit 0.236 — 0 1 1,652
Venture-Experience 1.925 1.926 0 3.060 1,628
Business—Experience 0.578 0.667 0 1 1,643
Science—Education 0.380 0.333 0 2 1,643
PIC—Venture—Experience 1.932 1.987 0 3.496 1,588
PIC—Business—Experience 0.579 0.500 0 1 1,602
PIC—Science—Education 0.467 0.000 0 1 1,590
IC—Venture—Experience 1.588 1.609 0 3.496 7,464
IC—Business—Experience 0.600 — 0 1 7,668
IC—Science—Education 0.562 — 0 1 7,779
Independent-VC 0.605 — 0 1 1,652
VC—Age 4.175 3.989 2.485 5.966 1,652
VC—Size 4.551 4.690 0.262 8.412 1,640
Downside 0.490 — 0 1 1,611
Board 0.662 — 0 1 1,617
No Syndicate 0.359 — 0 1 1,307
Syndicate—Follower 0.408 — 0 1 1,307
Syndicate—Leader 0.233 — 0 1 1,307
Company—Age 2.984 3.258 0 7.073 1,367
Stage—seed 0.180 — 0 1 1,489
Stage—start-up 0.403 — 0 1 1,489
Stage—expansion 0.401 — 0 1 1,489
Stage—bridge 0.016 — 0 1 1,489
Deal—1998 0.120 — 0 1 1,489
Deal—1999 0.203 — 0 1 1,489
Deal—2000 0.378 — 0 1 1,489
Deal—2001 0.299 — 0 1 1,489
Biotech and pharma 0.140 — 0 1 1,638
Medical products 0.077 — 0 1 1,638
Software and Internet 0.305 — 0 1 1,638
Financial services 0.035 — 0 1 1,638
Industrial services 0.036 — 0 1 1,638
Electronics 0.052 — 0 1 1,638
Telecom 0.082 — 0 1 1,638
Consumer services 0.113 — 0 1 1,638
Food and consumer goods 0.020 — 0 1 1,638
Industrial products 0.017 — 0 1 1,638
Media & entertainment 0.068 — 0 1 1,638
Other industries 0.056 — 0 1 1,638
Number of companies — — — — 1,652Table 4(a): Univariate tests—venture ﬁrm level
This table presents univariate non-parametric tests for the diﬀerence of means of the dependent variables
and venture ﬁrm characteristics. High (low) values of Business —experience and VC—Age are those above
(below) the median. Old/Young venture ﬁrms are those above/below median venture ﬁrm age. Diﬀerences
signiﬁcant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level are identiﬁed by ***, **, *.
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv)
BUSINESS INDEPENDENT VC VC
EXPERIENCE VC AGE ALIVE
High Low Yes No Old Young Yes No
Recruiting 0.569 0.433* 0.555 0.380** 0.493 0.511 0.516 0.471
Directors 0.456 0.324* 0.425 0.312 0.378 0.403 0.425 0.311
Fundraising 0.612 0.419*** 0.551 0.434*** 0.503 0.525 0.508 0.525
Interaction 0.809 0.816 0.855 0.719** 0.795 0.830 0.806 0.825
Exit 0.220 0.183 0.206 0.192 0.232 0.171* 0.221 0.161*
Venture—Experience 1.928 1.940 1.994 1.800* 2.048 1.816** 1.957 1.882
Business—Experience — — 0.563 0.626 0.576 0.588 0.622 0.495*
Science—Education 0.461 0.264*** 0.390 0.299 0.357 0.367 0.381 0.323
Independent—VC 0.667 0.712 — — 0.712 0.667 0.704 0.658
VC—Age 3.740 3.800 3.790 3.725 — — 3.799 3.708
VC—Size 4.011 4.084 3.959 4.235 4.310 3.778** 4.405 3.270***Table 4(b): Univariate tests - company level
This table presents univariate non-parametric tests for the diﬀerence of means of the dependent variables
and venture ﬁrm characteristics. Boom years are 1998 and 1999, bust years are 2000 and 2001. Early Stage
are seed and start-up deals, Late Stage are expansion and bridge. Diﬀerences signiﬁcant at the 1%, 5% and
10% level are identiﬁed by ***, **, *.
(i) (ii)
CYCLE STAGE
Boom Bust Early Late
Recruiting 0.478 0.473 0.509 0.389***
Directors 0.387 0.393 0.411 0.342***
Fundraising 0.520 0.498 0.550 0.429***
Interaction 0.618 0.722*** 0.679 0.687
Exit 0.279 0.215*** 0.198 0.288***
Venture—Experience 1.996 1.887*** 1.913 1.980***
Business—Experience 0.559 0.584 0.615 0.526***
Science—Education 0.358 0.390* 0.420 0.331***
Independent—VC 0.583 0.617 0.657 0.560***
VC—Age 4.434 4.048*** 4.115 4.244***
VC—Size 4.780 4.507* 4.479 4.637**Table 5: Across-ﬁrms involvement
This table reports results from Probit regressions for our base model of investor involvement (Equation (1)). De-
pendent variables are RECRUITING, DIRECTORS, FUNDRAISING, and INTERACTION. Independent variables
are VENTURE—EXPERIENCE, BUSINESS—EXPERIENCE, SCIENCE—EDUCATION, INDEPENDENT—VC, VC—
AGE, VC—SIZE, DOWNSIDE, BOARD, SYNDICATE-LEADER, SYNDICATE—FOLLOWER, COMPANY—AGE,
STAGE dummies and DEAL-YEAR dummies. In all regressions, INDUSTRY CONTROLS are included but not
reported. Variables are deﬁned in Table 2. For each independent variable, we report the estimated coeﬃcient and
the t-ratio (in parenthesis), computed using (Huber-White) heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors, clustered by
venture ﬁrm. Values signiﬁcant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level are identiﬁed by ***, **, *.
RECRUITING DIRECTORS FUNDRAISING INTERACTION
Venture-Experience —0.015 (—0.20) —0.077 (—0.29) —0.330 (—1.35) 0.100 (0.24)
Business-Experience 1.059*** (4.39) 0.916*** (3.74) 1.191*** (4.28) 0.673** (1.98)
Science-Education 0.340 (1.05) —0.094 (—0.26) —0.154 (—0.46) —1.395*** (—2.96)
Independent-VC 0.562** (2.39) 0.694*** (2.80) 0.494** (1.96) 0.492 (1.60)
VC-Age 0.118 (0.74) 0.086 (0.57) 0.394** (2.43) —0.913*** (—2.57)
VC-Size 0.018 (0.25) 0.089 (1.16) 0.015 (0.20) —0.077 (—0.95)
Downside 0.264 (1.56) 0.133 (0.77) —0.196 (—1.23) 0.318 (1.39)
Board 0.863*** (4.39) 1.138*** (5.22) 0.655*** (3.04) 0.551** (2.38)
Syndicate-Leader 0.069 (0.41) 0.001 (0.00) 0.128 (0.64) 0.047 (0.21)
Syndicate-Follower —0.298* (—1.90) —0.336* (—1.84) —0.256 (—1.47) —0.078 (—0.43)
Company-Age 0.031 (0.83) —0.003 (—0.09) —0.007 (—0.19) —0.038 (—1.10)
Stage-Start-up —0.456*** (—2.65) —0.503** (—2.48) —0.480** (—2.53) 0.570** (2.01)
Stage-Expansion —0.500*** (—2.62) —0.395** (—1.98) —0.506*** (—2.83) 0.638** (2.02)
Stage-Bridge —0.164 (—0.49) —0.005 (—0.01) —0.431 (—0.90) 0.680 (1.08)
Deal-1999 —0.184 (—1.27) 0.174 (0.71) 0.147 (0.89) —0.154 (—0.92)
Deal-2000 —0.296* (—1.93) —0.103 (—0.46) —0.048 (—0.35) —0.007 (—0.05)
Deal-2001 —0.267 (—1.44) 0.084 (0.34) —0.164 (—0.81) —0.231 (—1.41)
Industry Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1,051 1,038 997 954
χ2 157.39 183.89 84.49 98.94
Pseudo R2 0.241 0.269 0.189 0.234
Model P-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000Table 6: Selection
This table reports results from our model of investor involvement (Equation (1)). Dependent variables are RECRUIT-
ING, DIRECTORS, FUNDRAISING, and INTERACTION. Independent variables are VENTURE—EXPERIENCE,
BUSINESS—EXPERIENCE, SCIENCE—EDUCATION, INDEPENDENT—VC, VC—AGE, VC—SIZE, DOWNSIDE,
BOARD, SYNDICATE-LEADER, SYNDICATE—FOLLOWER, COMPANY—AGE, STAGE dummies and DEAL—
YEAR dummies. In all regressions, INDUSTRY CONTROLS are included but not reported. Variables are deﬁned
in Table 2. Panels A, B, and C report results from models described in Section 5: an the instrumental variable (IV)
model, the Ackerman-Botticini (A-B) model, and the Sørensen-Heckman (S-H) model. For each independent variable,
we report the estimated coeﬃcient and the t-ratio (in parenthesis), computed using (Huber-White) heteroskedasticity-
robust standard errors, clustered by venture ﬁrm. Values signiﬁcant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level are identiﬁed by
***, **, *.
P a n e lA :I VR E G R E S S I O N S
RECRUITING DIRECTORS FUNDRAISING INTERACTION
Venture-Experience —0.058 (—0.22) —0.084 (—0.31) —0.360 (—1.46) 0.141 (0.46)
Business-Experience 1.213* (1.86) 1.164* (1.77) 1.742** (2.35) 2.739*** (6.75)
Science-Education 0.314 (0.91) —0.133 (—0.35) —0.244 (—0.72) —1.612*** (—3.94)
Independent-VC 0.572** (2.39) 0.710*** (2.73) 0.529** (2.04) 0.319 (1.35)
VC-Age 0.134 (0.74) 0.108 (0.67) 0.459*** (2.58) —0.199 (—1.04)
VC-Size 0.018 (0.25) 0.089 (1.18) 0.018 (0.26) —0.045 (—0.57)
Downside 0.275 (1.56) 0.149 (0.84) —0.149 (—0.85) 0.297 (1.58)
Board 0.849*** (4.36) 1.109*** (4.65) 0.597*** (2.78) 0.039 (0.17)
Syndicate-Leader 0.046 (0.23) —0.036 (—0.16) 0.034 (0.14) —0.140 (—0.77)
Syndicate—Follower —0.315* (—1.83) —0.363* (—1.79) —0.320 (—1.64) —0.184 (—1.33)
Company-Age 0.030 (0.80) —0.005 (—0.09) —0.010 (—0.20) —0.038 (—0.92)
Stage-Start-up —0.447** (—2.49) —0.488** (—2.34) —0.436** (—2.31) 0.499** (2.17)
Stage-Expansion —0.484** (—2.42) —0.371* (—1.69) —0.432** (—2.18) 0.541* (1.94)
Stage-Bridge —0.167 (—0.50) —0.010 (—0.02) —0.425 (—0.87) 0.175 (0.35)
Deal-1999 —0.174 (—1.26) 0.188 (0.78) 0.189 (1.16) —0.012 (—0.09)
Deal-2000 —0.285* (—1.86) —0.087 (—0.39) 0.006 (0.03) 0.047 (0.35)
Deal-2001 —0.256 (—1.40) 0.100 (0.41) —0.113 (—0.57) —0.181 (—1.18)
Industry Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
IDENTIFICATION IN THE SELECTION EQUATION
Local-Business-Exp. 0.887*** (4.91) 0.889** (4.78) 0.994*** (4.59) 0.706*** (4.05)
ρ —0.051 (—0.25) —0.082 (—0.41) —0.195 (—0.82) —0.969*** (—3.45)
Observations 1,051 1,038 997 954
χ
2 157.52 179.45 91.14 319.11
Model p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000Panel B: ACKENBERG—BOTTICINI APPROACH
RECRUITING DIRECTORS FUNDRAISING INTERACTION
Venture-Experience —0.142 (—1.47) —0.032 (—0.32) —0.071 (—0.68) 0.214** (2.34)
Business-Experience 0.307*** (3.45) 0.226** (2.58) 0.430*** (3.75) 0.132*** (2.90)
Science-Education 0.076 (0.53) 0.056 (0.38) —0.055 (—0.34) —0.313* (—1.71)
Independent-VC 0.180** (2.01) 0.190** (2.30) 0.183** (1.98) 0.172** (2.55)
VC-Age 0.025 (0.46) 0.059 (1.14) 0.141** (2.04) —0.113** (—2.06)
VC-Size 0.013 (0.41) 0.011 (0.35) 0.020 (0.50) —0.004 (—0.13)
Downside 0.085 (1.49) 0.039 (0.73) —0.060 (—1.08) 0.089 (1.27)
Board 0.255*** (4.18) 0.288*** (4.76) 0.213*** (2.66) 0.136* (1.82)
Syndicate-Leader 0.018 (0.34) 0.190 (0.31) 0.31 (0.56) —0.007 (—0.12)
Syndicate—Follower —0.093** (—2.12) —0.092* (—1.84) —0.080 (—1.28) —0.222 (—0.37)
Company-Age 0.007 (0.69) —0.001 (—0.07) 0.001 (0.02) —0.002 (—0.22)
Stage-Start-up —0.129** (—2.31) —0.143** (—2.13) —0.170** (—2.59) 0.134 (1.27)
Stage-Expansion —0.122* (—1.93) —0.098 (—1.39) —0.176** (—2.57) 0.112 (0.96)
Stage-Bridge —0.076 (—0.63) —0.020 (—0.14) —0.150 (—0.80) 0.145 (0.94)
Deal-1999 —0.043 (—1.15) 0.046 (0.75) 0.035 (0.72) —0.070 (—1.37)
Deal-2000 —0.089** (—2.15) —0.026 (—0.48) —0.015 (—0.23) —0.012 (—0.28)
Deal-2001 —0.094* (—1.92) 0.019 (0.32) —0.048 (—0.72) —0.055 (—1.22)
Industry Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
IDENTIFICATION IN THE SELECTION EQUATION
Country-Industry and Yes Yes Yes Yes
Stage interactions
Observations 1,051 1,038 997 954
F—test 11.52 9.17 5.93 7.62
R
2 0.268 0.287 0.230 0.215
Model p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000Panel C: SØRENSEN—HECKMAN APPROACH
RECRUITING DIRECTORS FUNDRAISING INTERACTION
Venture-Experience —0.077 (—1.18) —0.080 (—1.22) —0.099 (—1.29) 0.089 (0.79)
Business-Experience 0.295*** (4.23) 0.239*** (3.54) 0.406*** (4.65) 0.174** (2.17)
Science-Education 0.139 (1.38) —0.005 (—0.05) —0.059 (—0.51) —0.326** (—2.39)
Independent-VC 0.147** (2.12) 0.184*** (2.67) 0.178** (2.13) 0.136 (1.58)
VC-Age 0.076* (1.76) 0.061 (1.52) 0.127*** (2.61) —0.148** (—2.54)
VC-Size —0.004 (—0.20) 0.019 (0.90) 0.007 (0.29) —0.022 (—0.94)
Downside 0.080 (1.59) 0.039 (0.79) —0.057 (—1.12) 0.093 (1.38)
Board 0.270*** (4.54) 0.301*** (5.50) 0.213*** (3.11) 0.171** (2.29)
Syndicate-Leader 0.030 (0.59) 0.012 (0.21) 0.054 (0.81) 0.006 (0.10)
Syndicate—Follower —0.091** (—2.08) —0.093** (—1.99) —0.078 (—1.36) —0.019 (—0.35)
Company-Age 0.011 (0.98) —0.002 (—0.17) —0.001 (—0.10) —0.006 (—0.73)
Stage-Start-up —0.140** (—2.56) —0.142** (—2.54) —0.160* (—2.53) 0.162* (1.67)
Stage-Expansion —0.141** (—2.45) —0.096 (—1.51) —0.159*** (—2.77) 0.152 (1.49)
Stage-Bridge —0.048 (—0.41) 0.007 (0.05) —0.143 (—0.78) 0.163 (1.1)
Deal-1999 —0.050 (—0.24) 0.046 (0.77) 0.040 (0.81) —0.056 (—1.12)
Deal-2000 —0.091** (—2.17) —0.036 (—0.67) —0.010 (—0.17) —0.009 (—0.20)
Deal-2001 —0.098* (—1.82) 0.005 (0.08) —0.041 (—0.65) —0.057 (—1.19)
Industry Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
IDENTIFICATION IN THE SELECTION EQUATION
Country-pair Yes Yes Yes Yes
ﬁxed eﬀects
ρ 0.208* (1.93) 0.138 (1.06) —0.129 (—0.84) —0.186 (—0.77)
Observations 1,038 1,051 997 954
Potential deals 118,228 118,224 118,223 118,210Table 7: Exit
This Table reports results from model of exit (Equation (2)). The dependent variable is EXIT. In each col-
umn of the the exit equation the independent variables are one measure of investor activism (RECRUITING, DI-
RECTORS, FUNDRAISING, and INTERACTION, respectively), DOWNSIDE, BOARD, SYNDICATE-LEADER,
SYNDICATE—FOLLOWER, COMPANY—AGE, STAGE dummies, and DEAL—YEAR dummies. In the selection
equations independent variables are VENTURE—EXPERIENCE, BUSINESS—EXPERIENCE, SCIENCE—EDUCATION,
INDEPENDENT—VC, VC—AGE, VC—SIZE, DOWNSIDE, BOARD, SYNDICATE-LEADER, SYNDICATE—FOLLOWER,
COMPANY—AGE, STAGE dummies, and DEAL—YEAR dummies. In all regressions, INDUSTRY CONTROLS are
included but not reported. Variables are deﬁned in Table 2. Panel A reports estimates from the Probit model, Panel
B reports estimates from the IV model, and Panel C reports estimates the IV-cum-Mills model discussed in Section
6. For each independent variable, we report the estimated coeﬃcient and the t-ratio (in parenthesis), computed using
(Huber-White) heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors, clustered by venture ﬁrm. Values signiﬁcant at the 1%, 5%
and 10% level are identiﬁed by ***, **, *.






Downside —0.140 (—1.30) —0.155 (—1.39) —0.127 (—1.09) —0.191* (—1.71)
Board 0.377*** (2.70) 0.298** (2.32) 0.251* (1.91) 0.268** (2.20)
Syndicate-Leader 0.046 (0.30) 0.029 (0.19) 0.001 (0.01) 0.113 (0.73)
Syndicate—Follower 0.065 (0.40) 0.039 (0.24) 0.095 (0.54) 0.067 (0.44)
Company-Age 0.044 (1.64) 0.044 (1.62) 0.056** (2.01) 0.028 (0.93)
Stage-Start-up —0.034 (—0.26) 0.028 (0.23) —0.028 (—0.22) —0.005 (—0.04)
Stage-Expansion 0.379** (2.41) 0.415** (2.71) 0.398* (2.48) 0.390** (2.30)
Stage-Bridge 0.780** (1.97) 0.806*** (2.03) 0.686* (1.70) 0.763* (1.87)
Deal-1999 —0.168 (—1.31) —0.162 (—1.24) —0.148 (—1.12) —0.107 (—0.79)
Deal-2000 —0.104 (—0.78) —0.105 (—0.79) —0.066 (—0.47) —0.057 (—0.39)
Deal-2001 —0.435*** (—2.84) —0.431*** (—2.72) —0.420** (—2.49) —0.412** (—2.55)
Industry Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1,159 1,046 1,005 962
χ
2 125.80 120.40 130.29 133.77






Downside 0.234** (1.96) —0.217* (—1.85) —0.094 (—0.80) —0.213* (—1.80)
Board 0.017 (0.08) —0.112 (—0.46) 0.115 (0.63) 0.156 (0.94)
Syndicate-Leader —0.023 (—0.15) —0.022 (—0.14) —0.044 (—0.24) 0.132 (0.87)
Syndicate—Follower 0.113 (0.67) 0.108 (0.66) 0.111 (0.60) 0.081 (0.49)
Company-Age 0.028 (1.00) 0.040 (1.54) 0.056* (1.94) 0.037 (1.18)
Stage-Start-up 0.134 (0.94) 0.196 (1.40) 0.071 (0.52) —0.062 (—0.39)
Stage-Expansion 0.520*** (3.63) 0.496*** (3.82) 0.491*** (3.16) 0.337* (1.76)
Stage-Bridge 0.808* (1.92) 0.746* (1.91) 0.763** (2.12) 0.648** (1.60)
Deal-1999 —0.082 (—0.61) —0.168 (—1.21) —0.139 (—1.06) —0.088 (—0.65)
Deal-2000 0.006 (0.04) —0.037 (—0.25) —0.021 (—0.15) —0.074 (—0.51)
Deal-2001 —0.276 (—1.55) —0.355* (—1.90) —0.324* (—1.77) —0.391** (—2.41)
Industry Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
SELECTION EQUATION
Venture-Experience —0.063 (—0.98) —0.073 (—1.15) —0.127* (—1.80) 0.052 (0.51)
Business-Experience 0.307*** (4.51) 0.247*** (3.42) 0.396*** (4.60) 0.172* (1.99)
Science-Education 0.112 (1.23) —0.012 (—0.12) —0.048 (—0.43) —0.309** (—2.47)
Independent-VC 0.166*** (2.57) 0.090*** (2.70) 0.169** (2.12) 0.131 (1.50)
VC-Age 0.058** (1.41) 0.047** (1.20) 0.130*** (2.75) —0.126** (—2.43)
VC-Size 0.009 (0.44) 0.028 (1.39) 0.006 (0.28) —0.025 (—0.96)
Downside 0.086* (1.64) 0.044 (0.87) —0.062 (—1.23) 0.088 (1.29)
Board 0.263*** (4.59) 0.297*** (5.52) 0.214*** (4.15) 0.176** (2.39)
Syndicate—Leader 0.025 (0.46) 0.009 (0.15) 0.050 (0.76) 0.002 (0.03)
Syndicate—Follower —0.092** (—2.09) —0.094** (—2.00) —0.078 (—1.36) —0.021 (—0.37)
Company-Age 0.101 (0.91) —0.002 (—0.24) —0.002 (—0.15) —0.007 (—0.79)
Stage-Start-up —0.142*** (—2.60) —0.143* (—217) —0.160** (—2.54) 0.164* (1.72)
Stage-Expansion —0.143** (—2.49) —0.097 (—1.51) —0.158*** (—2.68) 0.159 (1.56)
Stage-Bridge —0.060 (—0.52) —0.001 (—0.01) —0.144 (—0.80) 0.170 (1.16)
Deal-1999 —0.047 (—1.18) 0.048 (0.78) 0.038 (0.77) —0.056 (—1.11)
Deal-2000 —0.077* (—1.82) —0.029 (—0.52) —0.021 (—0.36) —0.017 (—0.39)
Deal-2001 —0.077 (—1.50) 0.016 (0.27) —0.058 (—0.94) —0.071 (—1.42)
Industry Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
ρ —0.465** (—2.36) —0.492** (—1.99) —0.259* (—1.78) —0.166 (—0.85)
Observations 1,051 1,038 997 954
χ
2 150.09 180.68 117.79 136.76






Downside —0.232* (—1.94) —0.215* (—1.82) —0.105 (—0.88) —0.221* (—1.87)
Board 0.018 (0.08) —0.117 (—0.47) 0.115 (0.62) 0.167 (1.06)
Syndicate-Leader —0.024 (—0.15) —0.022 (—0.15) —0.052 (—0.29) 0.126 (0.81)
Syndicate—Follower 0.110 (0.66) 0.108 (0.66) 0.109 (0.59) 0.078 (0.47)
Company-Age 0.028 (0.98) 0.040 (1.49) 0.158** (2.01) 0.037 (1.20)
Stage-Start-up 0.132 (0.95) 0.198 (1.41) 0.052 (0.38) —0.060 (—0.38)
Stage-Expansion 0.517*** (3.60) 0.495*** (3.85) 0.472*** (3.00) 0.338* (1.80)
Stage-Bridge 0.806* (1.92) 0.745* (1.92) 0.741** (2.01) 0.650 (1.59)
Deal-1999 —0.081 (—0.61) —0.167 (—1.21) —0.143 (—1.10) —0.097 (—0.72)
Deal-2000 0.006 (0.04) —0.030 (—0.20) —0.046 (—0.33) —0.096 (—0.65)
Deal-2001 —0.275 (—1.49) —0.345* (—1.78) —0.361** (—1.98) —0.424*** (—2.58)
Inverse Mills ratio —0.004 (—0.04) —0.026 (—0.26) 0.107 (1.09) 0.095 (1.00)
Industry Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
SELECTION EQUATION
Venture-Experience —0.079 (—1.57) —0.087 (—1.43) —0.113 (—1.59) 0.065 (0.62)
Business-Experience 0.270*** (4.72) 0.241*** (3.38) 0.403*** (4.68) 0.173** (2.02)
Science-Education 0.127 (1.39) —0.004 (—0.04) —0.052 (—0.47) —0.314** (—2.48)
Independent-VC 0.152** (2.40) 0.181*** (2.66) 0.176** (2.20) 0.140 (1.66)
VC-Age 0.069 (1.70) 0.055 (1.38) 0.124** (2.60) —0.144** (—2.49)
VC-Size 0.002 (0.10) 0.025 (1.26) 0.008 (0.39) —0.022 (—0.94)
Downside 0.079 (1.57) 0.039 (0.78) —0.057 (—1.14) 0.093 (1.38)
Board 0.270*** (4.72) 0.302*** (5.62) 0.211*** (3.10) 0.173** (2.34)
Syndicate—Leader 0.024 (0.46) 0.008 (0.14) 0.053 (0.78) 0.004 (0.06)
Syndicate—Follower —0.093** (—2.09) —0.094** (—2.02) —0.079 (—1.38) —0.194 (0.35)
Company-Age 0.010 (0.94) —0.002 (—0.22) —0.002 (—0.17) —0.007 (—0.81)
Stage-Start-up —0.142*** (—2.63) —0.142** (—2.18) —0.160** (—2.53) 0.164* (1.74)
Stage-Expansion —0.143** (—2.50) —0.096 (—1.51) —0.158*** (—2.69) 0.159 (1.57)
Stage-Bridge —0.059 (—0.51) —0.001 (—0.01) —0.144 (—0.80) 0.171 (1.18)
Deal-1999 —0.048 (—1.24) 0.046 (0.76) 0.039 (0.79) —0.055 (—1.10)
Deal-2000 —0.089** (—2.26) —0.039 (—0.72) —0.011 (—0.19) —0.006 (—0.15)
Deal-2001 —0.093* (—1.79) 0.003 (0.04) —0.043 (—0.70) —0.056 (—1.23)
Inverse Mills ratio 0.067 (1.55) 0.055 (1.22) —0.054 (—1.04) —0.052 (—0.86)
Industry Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
ρ —0.465** (—2.36) —0.499** (—1.99) —0.248 (—1.49) —0.141 (—0.78)
Observations 1,051 1,038 997 954
χ
2 152.30 184.08 125.46 163.58
Model p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000Table 8: Within-ﬁrm involvement (conditional logit)
This table reports results from a conditional logit model (Equation (2)). The dependent variables are DIRECTORS,
RECRUITING, FUNDRAISING, and INTERACTION. The dependent variables are PIC-VENTURE-EXPERIENCE,
PIC-BUSINESS-EXPERIENCE, PIC-SCIENCE-EDUCATION, DOWNSIDE, BOARD, SYNDICATE-LEADER, SYNDICATE—
FOLLOWER, COMPANY—AGE, STAGE dummies, and DEAL—YEAR dummies. In all regressions, INDUSTRY
CONTROLS are included but not reported. Variables are deﬁn e di nT a b l e2 .F o re a c hi n d e p e n d e n tv a r i a b l e ,w er e p o r t
the estimated coeﬃcient and the t-ratio t-ratio (in parenthesis), computed using (Huber-White) heteroskedasticity-
robust standard errors, clustered by venture ﬁrm. Values signiﬁcant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level are identiﬁed by
***, **, *.
RECRUITING DIRECTORS FUNDRAISING INTERACTION
PIC-Venture-Experience 0.620* (1.71) 0.721* (1.94) 0.831** (2.48) 1.435*** (3.01)
PIC-Business-Experience —0.234 (—0.51) —0.805 (—1.39) 0.002 (0.01) —0.611 (—1.04)
PIC-Science-Education 0.178 (0.51) 0.165 (0.41) 0.215 (0.60) —1.115 (—0.21)
Downside 1.037*** (3.23) 0.732** (2.01) 0.551* (1.83) 1.354*** (3.23)
Board 2.311*** (5.89) 2.880*** (5.62) 1.371*** (4.39) 2.447*** (5.74)
Syndicate-Leader 0.147 (0.44) 0.228 (0.63) 0.580* (1.65) 0.845 (1.45)
Syndicate-Follower —0.531 (—1.57) —0.159 (—0.44) —0.458 (—1.47) 0.089 (0.22)
Company-Age 0.114 (1.34) 0.122 (1.27) —0.056 (—0.69) —0.125 (—1.07)
Stage-Start-up —0.028 (—0.08) —0.421 (—1.07) —0.281 (—0.89) 0.783** (1.78)
Stage-Expansion —0.295 (—0.70) —0.781* (—1.65) —0.431 (—1.08) 0.763 (1.49)
Stage-Bridge 0.065 (1.05) 0.352 (0.36) —0.696 (—0.82) 0.089 (0.06)
Deal-1999 —0.077 (—0.18) 0.991* (2.02) 0.393 (1.01) —0.167 (—0.32)
Deal-2000 —0.782* (—1.92) —0.084 (—0.18) —0.378 (—1.01) 0.225 (0.43)
Deal-2001 —0.973 (—2.22) —0.311 (—0.61) —0.900** (—2.13) 0026 (0.05)
Industry Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 659 536 622 421
χ
2 100.468 88.54 80.88 114.30
Pseudo R
2 0.196 0.211 0.158 0.315
Model P-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000Table 9: Within-ﬁrm task allocation
This table reports results from Probit regressions (Equation (3)). The dependent variable is IN-CHARGE. The inde-
pendent variables are IP-VENTURE-EXPERIENCE, IP-BUSINESS-EXPERIENCE, IP-SCIENCE-EDUCATION,
DOWNSIDE, BOARD, SYNDICATE-LEADER, SYNDICATE—FOLLOWER, COMPANY—AGE, STAGE dummies,
and DEAL—YEAR dummies. In all regressions, INDUSTRY CONTROLS are included but not reported. Variables
are deﬁned in Table 2. Columns (i) and (ii) report the estimated coeﬃcients for two diﬀerent speciﬁcations, and
the t-ratio (in parenthesis), computed using (Huber-White) heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors, clustered by
venture ﬁrm. Values signiﬁcant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level are identiﬁed by ***, **, *.
(i) (i)
IP-Venture-Experience 0.044*** (5.32) 0.052*** (5.37)
IP-Business-Experience 0.258*** (2.30) 0.346*** (2.76)





Company-Age 0.012 (0.39) 0.012 (0.34)
Stage-Start-up —0.124 (—0.80) —0.134 (—0.7)
Stage-Expansion —0.129 (—0.71) —0.146 (—0.72)
Stage-Bridge —0.092 (—0.23) —0.098 (0.72)
Deal-1999 —0.075 (—0.44) —0.064 (—0.32)
Deal-2000 —0.048 (—0.30) —0.021 (—0.11)
Deal-2001 —0.029 (—0.17) —0.016 (—0.08)
Industry Controls Yes Yes
Observations 4,056 3,372
χ2 37.65 40.02
Pseudo R2 0.010 0.013
Model p-value 0.014 0.029Table 10: Breaking out captive venture ﬁrms
This table presents univariate non-parametric tests for the diﬀerence of means of the dependent variables
and venture ﬁrm characteristics, comparing the mean for INDEPENDENT—VC to that of CORPORATE—
VC, BANK—VC, and PUBLIC—VC, respectivly. Diﬀerences signiﬁcant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level are
identiﬁed by ***, **, *.
P a n e lA :U N I V A R I A T EC O M P A R I S O N S
INDEPENDENT CORPORATE BANK PUBLIC
VC VC VC VC
Recruiting 0.555 0.374 0.358** 0.471
Directors 0.425 0.451 0.237** 0.367
Fundraising 0.551 0.338* 0.485 0.440
Interaction 0.855 0.752 0.716* 0.650
Exit 0.206 0.274 0.179 0.044**
Venture-Experience 1.994 1.746 1.840 1.777
Business-Experience 0.563 0.714 0.568 0.633
Science-Education 0.390 0.443 0.287 0.000***
VC-Age 3.959 3.404 3.761 4.354
VC-Size 3.790 3.708 4.656* 3.813
Panel A: MULTIVARIATE REGRESSIONS
This table reports results from Probit regressions for our base model of investor involvement (Equation (1)), reported
in Table 5, where we substitute INDEPENDENT—VC with CORPORATE—VC, BANK—VC, and PUBLIC—VC. For
each of these three independent variable, we report the estimated coeﬃcient and the t-ratio (in parenthesis), computed
using (Huber-White) heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors, clustered by venture ﬁrm. Values signiﬁcant at the
1%, 5% and 10% level are identiﬁed by ***, **, *.
RECRUITING DIRECTORS FUNDRAISING INTERACTION
Corporate—VC —1.240*** —0.698** —0.401 —0.175
Bank—VC —0.516 —0.850** —0.566 —0.508
Public—VC 0.245 —0.097 —0.404 —1.366**